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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In May ot
Chaos

reigned.

194.5,

Over

4 • .S

Germany was in

a state ot virtual collapse.

million Germans had been killed and over twice

as man7 had been driven .from their homes in eastern Europe.
to

physical property was unprecedented.

houses had been destroyed or
Dusseldorf, less than

the

In Berlin,

severely damaged.

In

7S per cent of the
some

and most

railway system was temporarily unusable.

agricultural

production was cut in half, and food,

increased

as

terribly

of

Much

Industrial and

clothing,

necessities were in severely short supply.

system was just

¥.i0st

bridges destroyed.

of the vital

aa

such

cities,

S per cent of the homes were inhabitable.

waterways and harbors were blocked

consumer

Damage

and

Germany's .financial

disrupted with a national debt that

had

ten times since 1939 and a currency which had in.f'lated

sevenfold in the same period.

l

The social structure had collapsed.

urban middle classes had, in a large part, become "proletarized.n
mood ot despair

prevailed.

privacy, food, and warmth

As people crowded into the ruined

became their only concerns.

1
Gordon Wright, !.!!!. Ordeal 2! Total !{£:
Modem Europe, ed. by William L. Langer (New York:
books, 1968), P• 264.

2

The
A

cities,

Political matters

19a9·124S,

The

arper Torch-

Rise of

! Stud1 ,!!! Personality ,!!!!!
J. Edinger, � Schwuacher:
Political Behavior (Stanford, Califomia:
Stanford UniverSity Press,
1965), p. 74.

2tewis

l

2

the farthest thin&• hom tb• mnda of the Geraan

were

peopl.e.3

In eontra•"• Genm,r• a Alteri.can occupiers bad esoaped the

The United Stet.ea had lost onl.7 )00 1 000

relati"Nl.Y ansoathed.

var

daad,

a

tragi.c nm1ber b11t. sUll sull vben ooq>aed to European lo•••·
industrJ, tc fltoll

American

being destro,.C 'bT

._., b:l gJIUWD t.re

Jltlldoualy• vi th product.ion nearl1 douhl.ina 4u.rinc the
ite

var

,..... ll With

uaive, WU..equipp ed armed torcu, the United State s stood

hant
a
tri.p

:rmrop..

over

Thia, then, was the situation 11b1oh exlne4 Wbc the Allies
asaml8d the

m111 "1:7 occup•tion ot �.

It••• al so the enviromen\

inilo which Gel'!Mn politic.i paniea r..,811Vlad.
!be objective ot this thesis i8 to _.:1.ne \be attitwlea aml
policies ot the Amenoan

ocoupation otticiala towud

emerging pu-t.tu, the German Social Deaocrat:ic Party
reaction toward

one
or

ot tbaae

SPD.

r...

American

earl.7 :post.var fJeZ'IWl poll ti.cal aot1vi t7 will be

ft1"ft;ved and. United State• oppo si'Uon to the SPD•a political and
eoonom:lc

goals emphaaiaed.

toward the SPD

apacial interest ia the American attitude

d.ui-1ns the cl"ild.•

'lfl1' intention to determine
when

O.t

over

the

Socill.ist Uni tr P•l"t7•

.it, during the period

hona 191&5 until 1949

Amm-iean poli.01 toward German political parties

be neutral, the United Stat.ea
Socialism and
personnel,

waa

oppo a9d

It is

was

proclaimed '°

to the SPD and 1te goal.a of

centl'el.1••tUm.. and t.c> d1900 ftl' if .&Jllerioan occupation

Who belieYed strongly in the Amencan qatam of federal.iam

and tree enterJ>ri••• did interfere in the� political p:roceas.t.o
the

diaadvantqe of the SPD.

w.

liaorc:ton

Wright, Total War, P•

265.

CH.APTER II
AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RF.- :EM.E.:RG l'll CE OF
GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES
In April of

1945, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff issued

a directive which was to be the basis of the American occupation of
This document is

Germany.

the directive dealt with

commonly referred to as JCS 1067.

Although

the whole broad range of problems facing the

American occupation, its political and economic aspects

are or importance

study.

for this

JCS

1067

called

"decentralization"

Germany.S

for American policy to work toward the

of both the political and economic structure of

This decentralization was to faoilltate:achieving the ultimate

objective of United States policy for Germany which wa s to "prevent
Germany .from ever again becoming
The
or

communique

a threat to the peace of the world."

6

of the Big Three conference at Potsdam in July and August

194.$ reiterated many of the points of JCS 1067, especially those on

decentralization and the maintenance or
living tor the German

only a DJinimal standard of

people.7

Department o! State, "Militar;:r Govemment of Germany:
Directive to the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces o!
Occupation," Department .2.£ State Bulletin, IDI (October 211 1945) 1

Su.s.
6

Ibid., P•

-

598.

2f. Germany: Polley ..!}!!
u.s. Government Printing Office,

7u.s. Department of State, Occupation

Prof)'eae, �45-46 (Washington,

!94

I

P•

9.

591.

D.C.:

.3

4
interesting to

It is

note that point

nine

the American occupation commander to "assure that
military government
group. 118

•

•

•

ffeiJ

1067 as well

economic recovery

and

as

would

•

•

•

•

•

1067 ordered

[.th.iJ

•

•

•

not become committed to any poll tical

1946 the United States would abandon

Before the end of

point or JCS

•

of JCS

this

its stringent restrictions on German

be

promoting the development of German

on a free enterprise basis, to the detriment of the SPD.

industry

Less than

a

week after

the

surrender of Germany, the .American

occupation forces were making plans towa.rd retuming some form or
governmental control to the German people.
State

Robert

Murphy• who was the

Department official assigned to advise the Military Government on

political matters, advised the Secretary of State that the United States
should immediately begin the re-establishment of German administrative

machinery on a
occupying
real

the

purpose

German

regional basis, with Germans who had not been :Nazis

positions.

Murphy stated at that time his belief that the

of American military government

people as soon as it

was

This opinion was not
however.

was to retum control to the

f'easible.9

universally shared by American officials,

Some believed it was too

early to allow a renewal o! political

activity, even by anti-fascist groups such as the SPn.lO
8nepartment

.2!

State Bulletin, p.

600.

Murphy to the Secretary of State, May 12, 1945, u.s.
Department of State, Foreip Relations of the United States: Diplomatic

9Robert
Papers, � /ftereafter

iiVl",V'ol.III,

cited as
(Washington, D.C.t
Germany
Austria;
sion;
1i
11
s
Co111
Office, 1968), P• 940.

�·•

European Adv.isor.y
u.s. Oovemment Prl.llting

10
Ambassador Caffery to the Secretary of State, June
p. 9hl.. Jefferson Caffery was Ambassador to France.

J, 1945,

5
By the middle of June, the local military governments in the
United States Zone were
problems.
to

becoming increasingly concerned with poll tj.cal

Some local poll tical

recommend candidates for office.
States, or OMGUS,

Germany, United

these groups as political parties
a

list of

n81tles

these groups to

had begun to ask for permission

grt>ups

was
as

The Office
unwilling

political meetings.

hold

at this time to recognize

such, but it

Permission

or candidates.

of Military Government tor
was willing to accept
of

was also granted for some

Un.fortunately, the lack of

lmowledge ot German political history was a hindrance to the military
government in deal:ing with these groupe.u
At this time, the United States instituted advisory councils to

try to bridge the gap between the administrative officials,, appointed by
This action gave

OMGUS, and the local German population.

recognition o political groups.
t

consultative and had

no

real

as a part of the American

The advisory councils

authority.

a�

were

f'acto

purel.7

The German people v.1.ewed. thm

administration and as a compromise, the

Councils satisf"ied fn people.12
The Military Government had also begun to consult with Germans
of various factions o obtain
t

their Views

on

Germany• s

future.

Consultations with the Catholic hierarchy in the American Zone revealed
the anti-socialist

11ilarold

l2Leonard

feelings of the Catholics.

Zink to Donald Heath, June

The clergymen feared any

10, 1945,

�.,

P•

948.

Krieger, 11'l'he Interregnwn in Germany:
March-August
!i1arter!z, LXIV (December, 1949), 524.

1945," Political Science

·

6

{German Communist

leftist activity, and they lumped the SPD, the KPD
left wing groups all together.

and other

Party),

denounced all these groups

and warned the

propaganda broadcasts condemning the

would lead to leftist
Toward the

The Bishop of Regensberg

Americans

harshness

that Russian

of the Western occupation

political gains in the United States

end ot July, the Unite d States

of some SPD officials on the occupation.

so u ght

Zone.13

out the views

However, the Americans

not making 81'11 specific judgeP.tents on the SPD yet because

the

were

party

had not announced a formal program.14
Richard

above SPD

Brewster,

the OMGUS

members, reported to

official who had spoken with the

Murphy that, other than the Communists,

most German political groups favored the ban which
political activity.

They seellled to believe that

with obtaining food and shelter
that

time.15

Brewster

also

to

be

in effect on

people were too concerned

worried with poll tical matters at

suggested that

the United States should support

He feared that the

a 11centertt German government.

was

terrible economic and

social conditions, plus the "hesitating" American policy

Germans to the left
On August

or

right.

16

18, 1945, General Eisenhower

to the Potsdam agreements, German

1.lirRus,

1945, Vol. II, p.

�bert Murphy

·P•

950.

15

!2!!!•1 P• 951.
16rb1d.

to the

drive the

that, according

political parties which were "democratic"

encouraged and allowed the rights or assembly and

would be

�.,

anno unced

wo uld

public

948.

Secretary 0£ State, July 21, 1945,

7
Free trade unions were also to

discussion.

they were compatible vi th
permission

be permitted, as long as

military security.

OMGUS

would

grant

for the above activities and was to report all those not

authorized as well as

those

that were.17

In late September, Murphy visited Munich tc review the denazification

programs on behalf of General Lucius D. Clay, then Deputy

Military Governor in the u.s. Zone of

He spoke with

occupation.

Military Government officials as well as with leaders of the Ge:man
parties.

16

While

on

this

trip, Murphy became involved in

a controversy

which indicated the direction in which OMGUS policy toward the SPD was
moving. During

the co urse of his investigation

Murphy decided

Bavaria,

should

Bavarian Government .formed.

plans for early'

be relieved and

official with an excellent ant1-nazi

at Dachau concentration camp.
Wilhelm Hoegner, also a

�.,

representative

Rosshaupter was

a

senior

record, including a long term

Social Democrat, for the
communists to

on

position because be

participate in any

government.19

17aeneral Eisenhower to the War
p. 954.

Department, August 7,

1945,

l8Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, October 3, 1945,
972.

Ibid., p.

-

a more

Eisenhower, however, had decided

would be less inclined to allow the
coalition

elections and the de-

Murphy had intended to recomm end Alb ert

Rosshaupter as the new Minister President.

SPD

the situation in

that Minister President Schaefer, a staunch

conservative who opposed .American
nazitication program,

of

l9Ibid
-·

8
Murphy met w1 th Hoegner and received his assurances that he would
try to
was

represent all the Bavarian poll tical

.Apparently, SPD members

eager to carry out United States policy.20

o:t this type were acceptable to OMGUS.
about a more independent breed

Murphy believed Hoegner

groups.

We shall

see

later how it

felt

of SPD poll tician.

Shortly a!'ter his retum from Munich, Murphy and Clay prepared
a

document on the

Department.

German political

situation which was sent to the War

It is worth examining to determine the official Ol'1GUS

interpre"t.ation or the German political parties.

It was reported that
large cities soon

and

after they

political parties

were

permitted.

In

Stuttgart, Frankfurt,

Kassel, the SPD and the KPD were most active, gathering moderate

and orderl.J' crowd.a.

In Munich the situation was

because the Christian Socialist Union
the Christian Democratic Union
active.
tor

had been formed in all the

(CDU)

(CSU),

a

li ttJ.e different,

the Bavarian

in the other

counterpart of

Laende�

The parties had avoided ttdoctrinaire" discussions

also highly

and had called

adherence to democratic principles, cooperation 'With the Military

Government, concentration on German reconstruction, and the
of

was

German life.

de-nazii'ication

However, only the communists favored the indiscriminate

removal of Nazis.21
The

url>an centers were developing a pattem of two left parties.

the SPD and the KPD.
m erg e .

�··

These tended to cooperate with each other but

The SPD seemed to be gaining the

2laeneral

p. 981.

*The

largest following• except in

Clay to the War Department, October 13, 1945,

Laender were

not

the German States.

9
Bavaria where the CSU appeared to be replacing the old Bavarian People's

Party as

the dominant poli ti.cal
The above

memo

group. 22

maintains the official palicy of

neutrality toward

the German poll tical parties which OMGUS continued to voice throughout the
The Mill tary Government

occupation.

reporting the

political

was

events as they

merely the "unbiased observer"

occurred

and remaining aloof as

long as democratic principles were not violated.

Unofficial policy was

_quite another matter.

In

early

October, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, the unofficial h�ad of

party conference to discuss the

the SPD, called for a national

facing Germany during the occupation.23

The

United

States did not look

f'avorably upon the idea of a national poll ti.cal meeting.

a firm

American occupation officials, attempting to keep

grip on political activity, believed that

or Land basis
-

was sufficient

The United States

for

1946.

p.

the time being. 24

for the

The elections

where pa rty pall tics would not

22rbid.,

organization on a state

continued this "limiting" policy

activity through the campaign
tor January 1

Murphy

early to consider any national or zonal scope

believed it was much too
for German parties.

problems

be

on

poll tical

elections scheduled for its

Zone

were scheduled in the small towns
significant.

Murphy ad.mi tted

that the

982.

23:taszlo

Gorgey, "The Influence of Foreign Policy on the
Social Democratic Party in Germant" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1964), P• 58.

Development of the

FRUS,

-

24aobert Murpb7

to the Secretary of State, November

1945, Vol. III, P• 1008.

301

19451

10
United States was attempting to make these

elections renect local

independent candidates and issues, rather than

issues.2S

This

activity too k place against the background of a survey,

conducted by OMGUS,. which revealed that
in the u.s. Zone favored

the

end

Wilhelm

James F.

26

was

or

the Germans

best quall.fied to

Murphy's interest in intemal Geman

of the year,

political a.ff airs had become

Secretar;y of State

over one-third

the SPD, and believed it

lead the reconstruction of Germany.
By

large party and zonal

quite obvious.

He forwarded

Bymea written by

the Bavarian

article to

an

Social Democrat,

Hoegner, entitled "Federalism, Unitarianism, or Separatism."

Murphy praised Hoegner as the "leading voice in Germany for
Hoegner•s support of federalism

state."

a

federal

had helped him to become a

favorite of American occupation officials.

Roegner had tried to make

a

clear distinction between federalism and separatism, not wanting to be

splitting up Germany.

accused of

However, Murphy knew that Hoegner•s

was in the minority in the SPD, which generally preferred a

position

centralized unitarian state to a

federal

whether or not Hoegner1 s ideas could
The

goverrmient, and he was conoenied

gain support. 27

strong showing by the SPD in the sm all town elections in

January 1 gaining a 501000 vote plurality out of 376,ooo votes cast,
surprised American

�· ,

officials.

�Robert Murphy

p.

1015.

The press was cautioned. not to take the

to the Secretary

of State, December 121 1945,

26.Ann a J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, eds., Public Opinion
in Occupied Germg:
The OMGUS Surveys, 1.9_�42 (Urbana, Illinois,
university of Illinois""Press, i970), P• l�
mus,

27Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, December 271
191.i.5, Vol. III, p. 1022.

19451

11

results

as

a national

trend,

but

better showing.

did not make a

c. L. Abcock,

victory by claiming

down the SPD

officials seemed disturbed that the CDU

that

an

OMGUS official, played

party platforms had

formalized, and the elections had been personality

not yet been
contests.28 Although

no one admitted it openly, OMGUS seemed clearly concerned with the
strength of the SPD in the American Zone.
As the German parties became

to

develop

more

definite programs.

more widely organized, they began

At

the Zonenbeirat*'meeting of

J\pril 31

1946, the SPD pushed through strong resolutions calling for immediate
unitJ and the eventual political unification of Germany, which

econoJlli.c

aid greatly the recovery or Europe. 29

it tel t would

Later that same month,
four

during a meeting of the

Konwandatura, the

paver control council in Berlin, the United States

voiced its official policy of
parties and factions.

once

again

neutrality toward individual political

However, it stated that it

was

oppo sed to

allowing, within the parties, small groups of leaders to override the
wishes or the

the

This

justify how the

ditticul t t.o

p • .3.

majori. ty. 30

�

!!!! ,!2!!.

29John

l'intea

Gimbel

was an

United States could

(Hereafter cited as

P•

e:xpound such a policy

N.Y.T.),

January 22,

The American Occupation ot Gemg:

Mili�, 19Y?-124fTstanrord,

1908),

admirable policy, but it is

.

1946,

Poli tics and

cil1rorn!as Stanford Univers!ty Press,
··

•

30aobert Murphy to the Secretary of State, April 13, 1946,
u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United Statess
Diplo!'1,.•;t.is Papers, 1946, Vol. V, the Bri ti8hCoiiiliO'nwe alf.Ii; Westem and
Central Europe (Washington, o.c.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1969),
P• 720.
*The Zonanbetrat

was

the Zonal Advisory Council in the

British Zone.

12
while

it was becoming increasingly opposed to the SPD in the American

�one.
Elections were held in the

larger towns and rural cowities in the

.American Zone during the final week in
parties won a

majority, but the

April of 1946.

number of

votes cast

previous elections, and the results were not
a

national election might be decided. Jl

after the elections that the United

The conservative
was

sufficient to forecast how

The SPD

was

quick to charge

States was "stacking

favor of their "reactionary" opponents.

less than in

the cards" in

It had become evident to

observers that Germany was being squeezed between extremes, with each

occupying

power trying to build its zone into

political

and economic system.

On May
the .American

This was true in

the East and West.32

Zone, Kurt Schwnacher made what the New York Times called
----

which he lashed out at
Oemans who had

a German since the end of the war, in

occupation policies.

better.

He

now

had a

an

for

on

responsibility toward Europe.

Jlw.I.T.,

Germany, since

it the Ruhr were separated from the

He also condemned the Western Powers for failing to
May

32Ibid., P• 9.
-

of

The SPD

"charity", and he claimed there could be little

a democratic German nation

rest of Germany.

were

told the United States that,

leader protested the extensive deindustrialization

Germany could not live

age when they

amnesty

also claimed that German guilt was

interwoven with international guilt, and he
aa a world power, it

Schumacher called for

joined the Nazi movement at

too yowig to know any

hope

011n

26, two days before the elections in the large cities in

"the most significant speech" by

for

a carbon copy of its

6, 196
4 , p. 8.

lJ
helped bring on the

break up "big capitalism,," which he asserted had
war.

3.3

Thia open criticism of American occupation policy certainly did

nothing to endear Schumacher and the SPD to OMGUS officials.

Throughout the sumer of
occupation policies.
Zone, he told
either

1946,,

Schumacher continued to attack

Speaking in Frankfurt, located in the .American

audience of five thousand

an

all of Potsdam or

dismantling Germm

none of it."

free

industry,, and he emphasized that if Germany could not

order to survive.

enterprise ideology
agriculture.

have the economic unity promised

The SPD chairman confronted American

with the statement that "sociallsm11 was

"surest way to disarmamentn and demanded
and

that "the Germans want

He again criticized the policy of

have her industry, then she must at least
at Potsdam in

people

the

the

socialization of industry

Schumacher maintained that Hitler would never have

come to pPWer if German hea-vy industry

had been

socialized.34

While 1 t is doubtful that Schumacher had any effect on it,

American policy

toward Germany began to change in
coming change

There

were

House

Special Committee on Post-war Economic

indications of the

even

the

summer of 1946.

before that time.

The

Policy and Planning had

concluded in November of 1945 that the stringent controls on German
economic growth had to be
enough to provide
and resume its

relaxed if Gemany was to be able to

its ovn population even a minimal standard

34Ibid.,

May
June

6• 1946. P• 8.
24, 1946, p. 6.

gf !!'!.! House Special
Planning : Economic Reconstruction
Government Printing Office, 1945), P• 33.

3Su.s. Congress, House, Eighth Report
Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and
Europe

of living,

place as a vital component in the European economy.JS

3�.Y.T.,

!!!

produce

'{Washington,

D.c.:

u.s.

A prosperous free economy in Germany

was

now

seen

to be vital for

Allen Dulles voiced this general opinion in

European reconstruction.

1946 when he declared that if the United States failed to make a free
a

economy work 1n Germany, the communists would use this failure as
strong argument

tor their

own system.

)6

The change in policy was evident to observers in Germany, and

the

!!!! �

Times reported on June 24, 1946 that American policy

shifting .from

an

de-nazi£ieation

was

emphasis on de-militarization, de-industrialization, and

to re-education and the solution of economic problems.

OMGUS officials voiced the
were solved, there would
On September

opinion that, unless economic difficulties

be littJ.e hope for democracy in Germany• .37

6, 1946, Secretary of Stat.a James F. Byrnes delivered

a speech

at Stuttgart which many historians view as a turning point in

American

:policy

to make

a

toward

Germany.

Byrnes

was

encouraged by General Clay

palicy statement 1n Germany which could help Clay in his

occupation policies and which would also be
intransigence

on

a

response to Russian

Geman problems. 38

Byrnes called for
German economic growth

as

an abandonment

of the strict controls on

had been directed in JCS

increasingly productive German economy.

1067 and asked for

He maintained that conditions in

Germany at that tbte prevented the attainment or

even

industrial production on which the allies had agreed.
economic unity

was

an

the low levels or
He stated that

necessary in order for Germany to solve its pressing

c. Gardner, ••America and the Gem
r an Problem, 1945-49," in
Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, ed. by Barton J .
Qlladrangle Books, 1970) • P• 136.
Chicago:
BemsteinT

J6Lloyd

37!-!.Y.T., June 24, 1946, p. 6.
1947).

38James F. Byrnes, Jpeaking �--rankly (New York:

p.

187.

Harper and Brothers,

carry

economic problems, and he proposed central agencies to
reform. control inflation,

out currency

and ad."Tlinister industry and foreign trade.

The Se c r etary declared that Germany had to be allowed to produce enough
so

self

sustaining.

stating

He voiced what

that German

recovery was

was

now the official American opinion,

essential to general European recovery.

Byrnes also called for steps to be taken to form
draft a federal
An

certain

industrially based party such as the SPD should have welcomed
have aided industrial

ill .for

the SPD1 s

plans.

a

South Carolinian such

a

also

as

decentralized politic al

the ultimate

This concept would not sit well with Social Democrats
as

be

Byrnes called for the German political

on local responsibility

strong centralized state

one can

Another segment of the speech

system to be rebuilt from the ground up with
structure based

However,

growth.

that the kind of economy envisioned by

Byrnes was not a socialist one.

boded

a national council to

constitution.39

policies which would

as

thus make its economy

that it could export and purchase imports, and

essential for Germany•

John Gimbel does not believe

s

objective.40

who viewed a

future.

Byrnes speech at

Stuttgart was

a

shift in policy but was merely a maneuvering within the limits set
up

at Potsdam

consensus

to meet

the needs of Germany in

among historians is that

speech

39James F. Byrnes, 11A Self Governing
Q!l., XII (September 15, 1946), 708.
40James F. Byrnes, Speaking

However, the

the speech was a departure.

Bernstein and Lloyd Gardner believe the

,!:!!!

1946.41

Frankl.y,

indicated

Germany,"

Barton

a shift in

Vital Speeches

.2£.

P• 190.

4lJohn Gimbel, 110n the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement:
An Essay on Postwar German Policy, 11 ?oli tic al Science Quarterly, LY XXVII

(January, 1972),

246.

...

l6
response to Soviet attitudes while some, such

Harold Zink and Eugene

as

Davidson, stress the et.rect the change in policy had upon the attitudes
o! the

Germans.42

In any case, the United States was now committed

to restoring the German
recovery, and the

economy to a level consistent with European

call for

an

that American policy favored

The

first year and a

assembly to discuss
.fom of

some

a new

a

constitution indicated

German state.

half of the occupation had

thus

seen American

policy toward Gemany shift t.rom one of strict punitive measures to
of restoring Germany to

a place

in the

federal governmental structure and
the United States model.

a

European state system, with

after September

a

free enterprise system based upon

This same period also

small group of persecuted politicians into
with a definite program

one

saw

the SPD grow from a

a strongly organized party,

of socialization and centralization.

The period

6, 1946 would see these two opposing philosophies

Germany come into increasing confiict.

for

However, before discussing the

development of that conflict, it is necessary to examine the controversy
over

the Socialist

Unity P art.y, the SED.

Garnder in Politics and Policies, p. 134; Barton Bernstein,
Foreign Polley and the Origins of the Cold War," in Politics,!!!!!
Policies, P• 50; Harold Zink, .!!!!. United States!!! Germany,
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van :Nostrand Corqpany 1 19575, p. 9 ; and Eugene
An Account of the American
Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany:

42tloyd

".American

Occupation-rN'ew York:.A!.t'redA.

l�LJi:$5

Knopf,

19bi'),

P•
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CHAPTER III
THE UN IT"'...D STATES AND THE S&D OONTROVERSY
On September

14, 194.5, Otto Gro tewohl,

occupied Berlin, told a c rowd of over

an

SPD

leader in Soviet

2500 part7 members that the time

was right for the SPD and KPD to overcome their past d.U'.f'erences and
coopera te with

tront. "43

one ano ther to form

sincere " uni ted wo rking

a

This was the beginning or the

left wing of the SPD, with Russian

class

attempt by the pro- Soviet

backing , to form a single working

class party, a Socialist Unity Party.
The
worth

attempts to fo rc e the merger between the SPD and the KPD

stucs,1ng, bec ause they continued for

indicated the

However, the

over

are

a year, and they

coming breakdown in East-West relations regarding Gemany.

SED affair

is

also important, because it marks the one

major instance during the occ upation in whi ch the SPD in the we stem
Zones received full

American support.

The United State s paid close
the two

working

Secretary

cl. a ss

parties.

atten tion to the attempts to merge

On October

151 1945,

Murphy reported to

Byrnes tha t the KPD was pushing to form a single party.

indications were that, except in Berlin and the Soviet
Russian pres sure could be felt

more

Hie

Zone where

strongly, the SPD was having

none

of it. 44

4� . Y. T. , September
�-

151 1945 , P • 8 .

Murphy to th e S ecretary of State , Dec emb er 291 194.5 ,
1945 , Vol . I I I , P • 9 9 3 .

44Robert

17
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By January of 1946, the SPD in the Western Zones
criticizing the call for the merger, which
offici als had

no

SPD leaders

j urisdiction to call for such

Besides, until the KPD had proved its

move .

charac ter, the SPD would no t
SchWlilacher, who

even

a

democratic and national

new

consider such

an

idea. 45

already hated the KPD for i t1:1. responsibility

for the tall ot Weimar, had decided that the

proposed. unity party would
His strong stance against

be no more than a pupp e t or the Soviet Union.
the merger helped

openly

not only propo sed for

was

the Soviet Zone but also for the three Western Zones.
claimed that Berl in

was

solidify his position

as

the SPD leader since the vast

majority of SPD members agreed with his position.46
Murph7 believed certain elements of the SFD in Berlin and the
Ru ssian Zone

might have favored the merger with the XPD, but

whole the concept

was

not

popular.

SPD

on

the

to 'Whom Murphy had

sourc e s

access

told him that they resented the attemp ta ot the Berlin central comm:l ttee
to interfere in the politics
the merger itself.

was

in its

zone

zone ,

as

well a s the concep t of

SchW!lacher based his oppo sit.ion to the

grounds that the KPD

Murphy

of ano ther

was

the

representatiw ot

a

merger issue the difi'erences

over Germany which

the Soviet Union and the We stern Powers.

on

the

"foreign imperi al power. "

afraid that the Soviet Union would pu t pressure
to force them to accep t the merger. 47

merger

One

were

c an

on
see

S?D leaders
in the

developing 'between

In thi s instance the United

4SN . Y. T. , J anu ary JO, 1946, P• l.4.
46John Allen M8XW'ell, t1 So eial Democracy in a Divided Germany :
Kurt Schumacher and the German C)lestion" ( unpublished Ph. D. dissertation,
West Virginia University, 1969 } , P • 73.

�'

47Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, January 9, 1946,
1946, Vol. V, P• 701.
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States co uld better pro tec t

its hop e s fo r a c apitalisti c

independent SPD.

suppo rting an

in the Western Zones it would

If the

Germany by

merger were allowed to take place

likely provide a maj ority tor the opponents

of the free enterprise system, as well as increase Soviet innuence in
Suppo rting the SPD in its oppo sition to the

We stern Germany.

be consistent with Ame ric an policy for Gel"Jllany.

would thu s

Murphy' s fears o f Soviet p ressure were so on
reversed its
the

merger

merger.

�D

realized when the

earlier decision and agreed to a conference to consider
Gro tewohl planne d the

meeting

for

April 7.

The Ru ssians

we re

pre ssing hard for the amalgtmtation of the t1«> p arties and were threatening
to arrest SPD del egate s in the Soviet Zone who did not
Gro tewohl ' s decision

Ru s si an po sition.

support the

had come after Schumacher and

other We stern SPD leader s had refu sed to consider any conference on the
merger or
by

the

cooperation with the Eastern SPD,

Soviets.

'Which

was

already' controlled

Murphy believed that Gro tewobl. felt he had

no choice

but to yield to Soviet pressure, since he had no suppo rt .from the
We st. 4B
or a

The British had

c ome

to view thi s pre ssure as the opening phase

Russian plan to communize all or Germany. 49
Grotewohl soon fo und that he

party as well.
del egate s

At

had little support from hi s lo cal

a Berlin SPD meeting to di scu s s the propo sed merger,

demonstrated for over ten minu te s against Grotewohl.

official s claimed

that

Americ an

over eighty per cent of the delegates had voted

against the merger concep t.

They had demanded secret ballots for the

48Ibid. , P • 70) .
-

�.

49.Ambassador Gall am to the Sec retary of State, February 27 , 1946,
7o6.

p.
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question to guard ag ainst po s sible Soviet reprisals.
to confirm Schumacher •

Ru s sian Zone would
the merger aa

an

s

The re sults tended

belief that on ly a small UJino ri ty outside

support

the merger.

the

Many American offici als , who viawed

attempt by the KPD to gain innuence in greater

propo rtion than 1 ts elec to ral strength, b elieved the results of the
meeting would

prob ably convince the KPD not to pu sh the
SO

Soviet Zone in

April.

.fea sible

to pro tect any SPD members who se

means

merger outside the

The Uni ted States had al so decided to tak e all

bec au se of their oppo sition to the

safety might be threatened

merger. Sl

On March 20, K athleen McLaughlin reported that the Russians

were

imprisoning opponents of the merger in Buchenwald and other conc entration
c amps.

Wilhelm Pieck, the KPD leader, s a id it

merger take place by March

)1.,

imperative that the

new party could begin creating

which would elindnate the need for the occupation.

conditions

the Uni ted States was

maintaining

while Great Bri tain, F!'ance, and

a position of

Publicly

neutrality in the affair,

the So v.1. et Union openly backed their

"p:ro teges." 'lhe United States drew criticism from some corners

respective

for its po ai tion which would
political

that the

so

was

system. n52

"open the door to dangerous elements in the

However, privately, Ame rican

policy

was anything but

neutral.

Murphy believed

that

mo st of tho se who favored the merger were

mo re interested in the tt So cialist"

portion of Social

Demo cracy, while

tho se who oppo sed it were concerned with the " democratic " content.
$0

N . Y. T. , March

FRIJS1

Sl..ao bert Murphy

21 1946, P • 2 .
to the Sec retax-y o f S tate , March 1 3 , 1946,

1946, Vol. V 1 P• 709 .

S�.Y. T� 1

March 20,

1946, P • 10 .
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Thi s
well

statemen t is renective of Murphy' s o ppo sition to sociali zation as

as the .American position in general.

Gro tewohl had abandoned democratic

principles

in the

hope of achieving a

Compared to thi s ac tive preaching or "cla s s

socialist sta te.

Schumacher • s brand
United States.

He had now decided that

of social democracy

Murphy

believed

that

of reac tionary capital ist forces and
oc cupiers in order to p revent
On March

wa s

the

struggle, "

much more accep table to the

SPD feared the re tu.m to power

would coop erate wi th the we stern

it. SJ

26, the Berlin SPD executive council app roved holding a

referendum to decide the merger question.

The di scus sion came about

partially due to criticism within the party, but primarily bec au se ol
Deputy Military Gove.mer Lucius D. Clay ' s anno uncement that the merger
would no t be recognized in the u . s. sec to r unle s s the mas s of the

party

app roved it, not j ust the execu tive committee .

pro

In protest, the

merger group s decided to boyco tt the referendum.
on

They would only vote

t h e question at the party conference scheduled for mid-April.

United States intended to observe the referendum clo sely to
it wa s c onducted

wa s

held

on

police in the Soviet Zone clo sed

Ma rch

3l in Berlin.

attempting to cover the election.

However, the

polling places and seized voting lists

to prevent the referendum from t aking place .

They also harassed

reporters

In the Weatern Zones , the vo te was

over seven to one against the merger.

�. ,

make c ertain

democratically. 54

The ref erendwa

FRUS ,

The

Even former KPD

5 3Robert Murphy to the Secretary
1946, Vol. V, P• 711.

strongholds

of Sta te , March

20, 1946,

54Robert Murphy to the Secr etary of State, M arch 29, 1946,
P• 714.

f'ailed
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to support it. 55

The l arge

Soviet Union from

the

executive
tor

an

majo rity against the merger did not prevent

continuing to push the ide a .

the party organi zation, even before the

imm ediate combination of

To counteract these actions, the an ti-merger portion

of the SPD asked permi ssion to hold a
April 7 .

The request was

granted by the United States, in the hope

the merger.
new

K arl

and the other leaders who had supported

Germer, Franz Newmann , and Kurt

by

c o-chairmen

Grotewobl

a

vote of 484 to l .

leadership had tried to sell the
As expected,

Swolinsk.Y were named

party ou t to the KPD.

58

and French support

newly elec ted chairmen, while the

Union a sk ed that the ma tter be dropp e d.

old

They maintained that th e

the Uni ted States with British

b acked the recognition of the

Kommandatura. 57

to the surprise of

The c onvention was held as scheduled, and,

one, it vo ted out

Zone

convention in the Americ an

of bringing the entire question under discussion in the

no

the SPD

committee, which was by then under Soviet control, to call

April convention .56

on

I t .fo r ced

Soviet

The Western powers replied that

the question wa s important and suggested that the Komma:ndatura officially
recognize

th.at

the SPD was split over the m erger i s sue and call tor tho se

who wi shed to

join with the KPD to do so , while the SPD remained

independent.

The

Soviets still refused to discuss

the matter at that

time. S9
SSN . Y. T.
FRIJS,

,

April 1 1 1 946, P• l .

Murphy to the Secretary of State ,, April 5 , 1946,
1946, Vol . V, P• 715 .

S�bert

57Ib1d.
, P• n6.
-

SB
N . Y. T. , April 8, 1946, P • 9 .

�'

59Robert Murphy to the Sec retary of State , April 13, 1946,
1946, Vol . V, P • 719 .
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the

De spite the referendum ag ainst
Ru s sian Zone

joined

force s on April

Socialistiohe Einheits

Partei

( SED) .

Gro tewohl predic ted

be best for Germany.
new

People who attended the meeting

The n ew S ED declared that
The

achieved.

However,

tailing .

the

merger in the We stern Zone s

official s v.Lewed thi s controversy with increa sing

I t was obviou s that attempts to force

The SED

while the SPD

On April 21,

primarily due to Schumacher ' s tireless

6l

American

60

members 1n

working class unification had

effo rts again st them, attempts to promo te

control.

as sistance would

Communi sts would dominate the SPD

Grotewohl decl ared that the dream of

were

Sovi et

party because the latter still ttneeded training. "

finally been

that the me rger

that they had not taken part in the previo u s meeting which

had ousted Gro tewohl .

the

the SPD and KPD in the

l4 and decl ared the formation of the

would soon spread to the Western Zones.
had to swe ar

merg er,

was

was

the

merger h ad hurt

concern.

quadripartite

continuing to function without official. permi ssion

being forced to Hlay low" in the Soviet Zone.

Murphy

decided that, if the Soviet Union refu sed to make the SED submit to
Komm andatura control,
authori sed in

the United States should ac t as

the other zones .

th an a simple matter o f
The SED

60

N . Y. T. ,

62Robert

were

Murphy, th e issue w a s now much greater

merging political p arties.

qu e stion was p assed

Gene!'al K alikov,

61rbid.,

To

if the SPD

on

62

to the Allied Control Council.

the Soviet representative , pressed for imedi ate
April 15, 1946, P• 1.
April 22, 1946, P • 10.

Murphy to the Sec retary
FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, P• 721.

of

State, April 13, 1946,

recognition of the SED.

The

Uni ted S ta tes attempted to trade Westem
but the French

rGcognition in retum for Soviet recognition of the SPD,
oppo sed

this since the SPD had voted against a merger.

will in g to

France

was

recognize the SED as a new party, but not a fused one .

The

Berlin SPD chairman, Germer , wrote the co uncil tha t the SPD needed
allied support and tha t its policies had not
sm all group had bolted to the

changed simply becau se a

SED.6 3

With the merger of the SPD and KPD in the Soviet
inability of the Control Council to solve the
moved to the background.
e specially with the
the United

Zone and tho

problem, the SEO at.fair

However, it was by no

means out of sight, and,

attempts to complete a merger in the Westem Zones,

States and the SPD still had to deal with the qu e stion

periodically for

over

a year.
I

The Soviet Union wa s doing no thing to make the problem any more
On July

solvable .

18, 1946, the SPD lead.Grs met in the

Soviet

sector

of Berlin to protest the Ru ssian ' s unfair treatment of the SPD.
Ru ssians had

The

been forcing the SPD to submit speeche s prior to their

delivery, requiring complete personal da ta

forbidden the distribu tion 0£
SPD ' s position ot

a leaflet

on

all SPD l eaders, and had

written by Schu:m acher. 64

The

independence had done no thing to ende ar it to the

Russians, and there

wa s

little hope that the situ ati on was going to

improve .

The SPD, however, wa s not halted by Ru s sian harassment, and it
continued to pre s s .forward its principles.

6�. Y. T. ,
64

�·

1

Ap ril 27, 1946, P• 4.
July 19 1 1946, P • 4.

During the el ec tion campaign

in Saxony in l ate sunnn e r, the SPD
It placed its o wn po sters

SED.

openly and vehemently attacked the

o ver tho se of the SED, acousing the SJID

of wo rking toward a communist dictato rship ,, one which
roo t. 6S
and

2$

had already taken

The SPD was no t giVing in to Ru s sian pressure withou t a :fight,,

this

attitude

evidently p aid off in the Berlin elec tions in October,

in whi ch the SPD finished ahead o f the SED in the SED • s

own

stronghold,

the Russian sec tor. 66
In return for its election

successes, the SPD c ame under the

brunt o f a vic ious Soviet prop aganda camp aign.

Pravda

o f being a new fuehrer and condemned hi s recent

trip to Great Britain.

The Ru ssians accu sed SPD members of

acc u s ed Schumacher

joining the N azis in

droves

in the

Sch11macher denied the charge s and said that he was certain that

19 30 ' s.

Mo scow could forgive him for being a tuehrer, bu t never for being

deroo crat.
and

He also denied that he

procl aimed hi s independence .

wa s

67

a

a tool o f the Wes tern democracie s

In January of 1947, the Komandatura again to ok up the problems
between the SPD
Union •

s

and the SED.

The United Sta te s

refusal to permi t .freedom or action for other p arties in i ts

zone while openly supporting the SED.
p ressed tor a return of
as

obj ected to the Sovie t

was possible.

68

The Uni ted States representative

responsibility to German elec ted bodies as soon

65N.Y. T. , September 8• 1946, P • 2 8 .
66rbid. , O ctober 21 . 1946. P • 2.
-

67Ibid. , December 10, 1946, P • 10.

68Robert Murphy to the Secretary of S ta te , J anu ary 6, 1947,
u . s . Department of State, Foreign Rel ations of the United State s :
1247, Voi. II , Council ofForeign Mini sters; Germany
Diplomatic
U . S . Governm en t Prin ting Office , 19 72 ) , P •
and Au s tria WaSllin gton, D. C . :

P�ers,

842 .

So on after this meeting, 1 t

rumored that the Soviet Union

was

would be willing to allow the SPD to operate in its zone if SED

rejoin the SPn . 69

leaders, such as Grotewohl , wo uld be allowed to

would

be like

asking the proverbial fox to gu a rd the chickens.

the Ru s sians pre s sed

ahead with their

discus s with SED l eaders

Schumacher

plans.

was invited to

how the SPD might be allowe d to retum to t he

.followers in the Soviet Zone wanted the SPD to
Ru ssians that

he would

but he would ac c ep t

no

retum.

He told the

re-establi sh the SPD in their zone,

be happy to

deal s to attain this in which he

would be

carry out Russian wishe s . 70

These

attempts to "woo " the SPD

build th e SED into a national party.
the

However,

Schumacher considered the offer bec au se he knew hi s

Soviet Zone.

expec ted to

Thi s

were

On

part or a Soviet effort to

March 8, SED le aders came into

Am eri can Zone to promote a merg er of the working class p arti e s in the

We st.

They hoped to set up collaboration with the SPD on

formal merger could

might change its name to SEO.

declared

the KPD in the Westem Z.Ones

The result li!O uld

give the weak KPD a

formal union w1 th the powerful, Soviet backed S:&D.
such a

A

take place l ater. 71

At Munich, Otto (lrotewohl

opposed

the trip .

Even though Schumacher

move, Am erican observers believed some dissident left wing

members of the SPD might be dratm in under the

69N . Y. T. , Janu ary 101 1947 , P • J.

701oid. ,
-

n

J anuary

Ibid. , March

-

72Ibid. ,

March

24, 1947 , P • 9 .

9, 1947, P • 5.
15 , 1947 , P•

11.

new name . 7 2
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The attemp t by

�

acconpli on the merger i s sue

OMGUS

l ef t

the

United States

indecisive .

felt, a t tha t time,, that i t would no t be wise to forbid the
its name to SEO since it would draw so few SPD :members

KPD to change

myth that the SED was a 11uni ty11 party would.

th at the

However,, it realized

soon

be dispell ed.

that the resulting p arty would be larger than the

The main argument against granting the name change , however,

original KPD.
wa s

the Soviets to face the We stern allie s with a

that it wo ul d mean allowing the undemocratically

fo unded SED to

operate freely in the u . s . Zone withou t reciprocity for the SPD in the
Opp onents ot granting the chan g e believed it wo uld be

Soviet Zone .

throwing away a " trump cardtt which could be u sed to correct the political
situ ation in the Russian Zone.

This group tho ught the United S ta tes

might

require a referendum of SPD and K?D members in the American Zone to decide
the issu�

democratically.

They al so wanted to make it cle ar to the

Ru ssi an !'J th at authorizing the SED would hinge upon their adherence to
e qu al rights for all p artie s, including the SPD in the Soviet
The State Department decided that the
into the American Zone

by the surprise
allow the SED to
Russian

wa s

less than

of p emi tting it.

danger of allowing the SED

wha t the United State s might gain

Washington decided

operate, contingent

Zone . 73

on

that OMGUS should

equal rights £or the SPD in the

Zone . 74
This decision

wa s

oppo sed by Walter Bedell Smith, the Americ an

ambassador in Mo scow., who viewed the whole S.BD affair a s a step in the

FRUS,

.!2!2• ,,

7.3nonaJ.d Heath to the Secretary of State, March 15, 1947,
1947,, Vol . II, P• 857.
74The Secretary o f State to Donald Heath, March 21 1 1947 ,

P•

859

•

28
Soviet plan to increase 1 ts influence in the Western Z.Ones.

Failure to

resist the intrusion of the SED into the .American Z.One wo uld

hurt

progressive elements , and to permit the name change without

democratic
a quid

pro quo

into their
tour

offer £or the SPD from the Soviets wo ul d be pl aying right

hands .

Smith believed that by all owing the SED leaders to

the American Zone , OMGUS was subverting p recisely wh at it was

suppo sed to be

supp orting. 7S

By early April , the United States had still not decided whether
to c all for a referendum

or a sk for

further complicated th e situation by
States should authorize the SED to

certain thi s would

would

On

quid pro guo agreement.

decl aring he believed the United

operate

in the

u . s. Zone.

As tar a s the political numbers

April 11, 1946, Mayor Otto Ostrowski received
the

elect Erns t Reuter, a s trong
Lord Mayor.

man and

was required for

a

vote

Since

a

un an imous vote

a c andidate to be confirmed., the Soviet Union could
In thi s event, the SPD and CDU

planned to

7SAmbassador Smith to the Assistant Secretary of State,
1947 , �·

P•

861.

no

The Soviet Union and the Fren c h opposed Reuter, while the

Reuter ' s election.

76nc,nald

or

76

The SPD pl ann ed

March 29 1

�. ,

c oncerned,

a vigorou s anti-communi st, a s

United States and Great Britain supported him.

block

were

Berlin city co uncil due to his delay in eliminating

excessive numb ers of communists from city government.

n ew

He was

not be that much larger than the KPD that already existed.

confidence from

to

Schuma cher

closely identify the SED and communist cause more

clo sefy with the Soviets .
the SED

a

He ath to

the Secretary

of

State, April

8, 19 47,

29
refu se to p articipate .further in the Berlin c ity government.
intended to force a showdown over what democracy meant in

The SPD

regards to

Berlin. 7 7
O strowski resigned on

refu sed to accep t his resignation.

Control CouncU

attack ed the SPD and coo for
Soviet Union

did

maj ority from
because

They also bl amed Americ an intrigues for cau sing

as it did.

really was whether
govern

and the

re sign,

The Ru s sians cl aimed the SPD forced O strowski out

was friendly to them.

the SPD to act

forcing hi s decision to

The SED p re s s

its best to p revent the non- communi st

having its way .
he

April 17, but the Soviet member of the

Americ an officials countered that the issue

or not the allies were will ing to let the Germans

themselvea. 78
On

April 2), Colonel William Howley ,

an

Ameri can

occup ation

officer, told a press conference that the Berlin city government should
decide the

question itself.

He maintained that a year

the United

have cared which party controlled the government as long

State s wuld no t

as it had been elected legally.
de stroy the

before,

He accused the Soviet Union

of teying to

SPD. 79

OMGUS put

an

end to one stage ot

the

SED controversy on

May 3

when it made its decision on the application of the KPD in the u. s . Zone
to merg e with

the SED of Berlin.

The United States said p ermission

was

denied becau se, "while the SED p arty claims to represent an amalgamation

Ibid.

77Donald

Heath to the Secretary

of State, April 14, 1947,

78nonald

Hea th to the Secretary of State, Ap ril 23,

-

�. ,
�'

P•

864.

79nonald Heath to the
P • 865 .

Secretary of State, Ap ril

1947 ,

25 , 1947 ,

o f the So c i al Demo cra ts and the Communis t P arties ,
received from the So cial Democ ratic leaders to
0}1GUS had decided tha t it could
Bavarian KPD

which would imply

no t p ermit

a m erger

voluntary mergers on a r.onal
ll stalemate wa s reached

the

no

Zone. 81

operat.:ing in the American

merger tor several reasons .
reason, the

m erge r

was

an

Germany, East and We st.

change in name by the
The United

doubt• that it -wo uld no t

which, for all

Cla'6

propo sed merger. "

b a sia. 80

controversy over the S ED when, on J une

Military Governor, Lucius D.

j oin the

that had not occurred.

States reiterated.t for public consumptio n
oppo se

a

requ e s t ha s been

no

practic al purpo se s, ended

18, 1947 , the United State s

indefinite]¥ barred

the SEO .from

The United States ha d oppo sed

First, and thi s

attemp t to

was

.force a new

the

the offici3lly profes sed
political

p arty onto

Sec ondly, rel ations with the Soviet Union

concerning Germany had been

deteriorating, and OMGUS

had no de sire for

inc reased SoViet in!luence in the .American Zone and We stern Zone s in

which would have come about

general ,

into

the We st.

Finally, it

a reault of the SED• s introdu ction

the SPD and KPD had merged, it wo uld have been

the l arge st party in the u . s . Zone .

threat to

as

American hop es tor th e

As such , it could have been

a

seriou s

future of free enterprise in Germany.

Al l

o f the se f actors l e d OMGUS to suppo rt Kurt Schwqacher in hi s attempts to
maintain the independence of the SPD.

and the SPD were s tanding

However, even as the United States

side by side on the merger issue , they were drifting

farther ap art bec au se of th eir conflic ting plans tor the .fu tu re of po stwar Germany.

�. ,

80Press release f'rom OMGUS Headquarters , May 31 1947 ,
866.

P•

8�.Y. T. ,

June 1 8 ,

194 7 .

*clay became Military Governor i n

March of 191.i.7 .

CHAPTER IV
THE DEVELOPMElJT OF .AMERI CAN OPPO SITION 'ID THE SPD
Altho ugh the confrontation with the Soviet

Union

held mu ch of the Military Government ' s atten tion during

sole

was no t the United States '
in September

conc ern.

over the SED

1946 and 1947 , it

The Byrnes' speech at Stu ttgart

of 1946 had given a more definite form to American plans

tor post-war Germany.

At the

s ame time,

the German poli tical parties

had reached a stage of organization in whi ch they were now

de.tini te programs.

The

American view of Germany• s fu ture wa s much

different than the view of

the SPD, and thu s , the s tage was set for

a growing hostility between them.
June of

promo ting

The period from

September

1946

until

1948 revealed how far from neutrality in German political affairs

the Uni ted States ' po sition really was.
In
he believed

early October 1946, SPD Chairman Schumacher made clear what
was

the be et course for Germant to follow.

He declared that

sociali zation wa s an economic nece ssity for Germany, and o t the greatest

political

importance for the foundation of demo cracy.

democracy had li ttle chance on the 3\lrop ean
imbedded in Germany, and

He cl aimed that

continent unless

dominated government.
October

wa s

this could no t o ccur without socialism. 82

speech was an indication of what OMGUS could exp ec t from

82N.Y. T. ,

it

14, 1946, P • 5 .
31

This

a fu ture SPD

32
General Jo s eph T. McN arey,
Governo r 1 in hi s comments

on

the fir st United States Military

the Berlin elections later that same month

seamed unvilling to concede that the SPD party program had
among

the German people when he cl aimed that the SPD' s gaining nearly

filty per

cent of

the total vote was

against the co111Dtuni s t dominated c ity

the merger.
of

real support

really

an

expression of dis sent

goveniment and its attempts to force

McNarey said that many people may h ave

voted for the SPD out

protest, rather than out of suppo rt f'or its platform. 83
This growing

to Charles

trlistrust of the SPD on the part of OMGUS

" Chip " Bohlen,

travelling 1n Germany.
his vie w s or the

an

.Americ an State

:fiold

He

evident

Department otticial who wa s

the editor of the SPD newsp aper Freiheit

diffi culty the SPD was having gaining a favorable image

among .American officials and the public in general.
to have naade the

was

Bohl.en was

reported

.tollowi.ng comments i

You see , it is too bad that your p arty alway s sp eaks with a
language th at will only be understoo d in Germany".
I have always
understood what you want to say, bec ause I know the German
situation well . But just imagine an average American politician,
an average c itizen, when he read.a your statements his reaction i s 1
The Germans are never peaceful..
Bymes said something sensible
to thm, and immedi ately, they had to throw the baby out with the
bath.
Bohlen advised
symp athetic .

the

SPD to work with American

He said there

was some support for

journ alists who were

the SP D within goverruqent

circlea. 84
Bohlen believed the SPD was the
in German11 " but there

8� .Y. T. ,

84John

was

October

no

"only effective democratic force

clear concept a s to what kind of socialism

231 1946, P• 10.

Maxwell , Social Democracy, p .

216 .

3.3

but

the SPD should

He s aid tha t

it wanted.

should voi ce its de11ands in such

not a sk for socialism as such,

a way that .American politicians,

espec ially Demo crats, see ideas like a "planned economy " as a necessity
The SPD had to s tre s s tha t socialism was no t a

!or Germany.

act any more, but
only

an economic

necessity. "

Bohlen said so cialism wa s the

way to normalize Germany, and he hoped that

advantage

" revol u tionary

Schumacher wo uld take

of the po ints in Bymes ' speech that could help. BS

Unfortunately

tor the SPD, there were few .American officials who felt as Bohlen did.

The

biggest obstacle the SPD faced in

was Luciu s D.

Clay, then

but soon to be

Deputy Military Governor in

Military Governor.

In

complex.

to

The SPJl leader

the .American Zone

later years, Schumacher accu sed

Clay of having an anti-SPD complex, and more
Schumacher

implementing its program

specifically,

an anti

claimed that Clq ' s excessive dewtion

free enterprise led him to work against the SPD. B6
Although .American

offic ially neutral, OMGUS
this

policy

toward the SPD and its program was

actions belied that po sition.

Clay had shown

clearly in 1946 by his reaction to the Hessian constitu tion.

Article

forty-one of that document cal.led tor the socialization or industry 1 bu t
Clay decided that it co uld

only

be

implemented if'

separa te referendum trom the one which
as a

whole.

on.

would decide on the constitution

Thi s seems to indicate a hope, in vain,

the vo ters would rej ect
to decide

it were approved in a

on

Clq 1 s p a rt that

socialism if it were the only i s su e they needed

Even after

seventy-one p er cent of the voters approvad the

article, Clay decided it wo uld be " su sp ended " tor the time being.
BS�. , P • 217 .

86:rbid. ,

p . 219.

He

su bsequently refu sed to app rove all Hes si an a ttempts to inplement article
forty-one. 87

Harold Zink, the o fficial historian for the Americ an

occ upation, confirms that article

tries to defend

forty-one was unpopular with Clay.

He

Clay' s actions, however, by saying that implementation

of the article ' s provi s ions would have been ver, unpopul ar with

American

public opinion. 88

Clay further showed his oppo sition to the socialist goal s of the
SPD in

1946 when he fought .tor

an

he felt w uld de ter sociali zation.
issu e , he
The

effective decartelization law , which
When

Washington overruled him

immediately asked for a de!ini te policy statement

reply was, in effect, that the United States had

as the decision

wa s

reached in a democratic manne r .

ri0

on

on

the

so cialization.

objections, as long

OMOUS

asked al.most

immedi ately for a reconsideration, since the Berlin City Council had

recently app roved a broad socialization bill tor four power approval .
Clay

obj ected

to the bill ' s failure to provide for "fair

He also feared that approval

among other things.

comp ensation, "

o f the bill would

commit th e United State s to a pol icy of socialiS111 , "probably withou t

/Jb.iJ Uni ted
decided. "

89

States

or

Congress realizing such a

.Although Clay ' s "official" policy at
German

basic issue had been

the time was to allow the

people to decide fo r or against socialism, whenever they

a po sition to choo se freely at a

He

hoped that " free enterpri se "

87John Gimbel,

.'!!!.!

88Harold Z ink ,

!a! � !!! Germ anz, P • 181 .
J:a! .American O ccup ation, p . 170 .

Gimbel ,

in

national level, bis internal co rrespondence

reveals his oppo sition to social ization.

89Jobn

were

American

Occupation, p . 117 .

would

become so firmly e stablished in the meantime that the German people
their ri ght of choice .90

would never exercise
of

the Army that there mu st

be "economic and

Clay wrote the Secretary

political stability before

the German p eopl e

can

be expected to freel,y exercise their views. "

said, "Time is on

our

side.

enterprise

an

issue before the

In la te December of

formed.

an

This

zone .

•

•

deter the i s sue while free

German people. w9l

1946, the United States and Great Britain

economic union between their zones.
organization would bring

new

the SPD members from both
controlled

•

continues to operate and economic inlprovement results, it may

never become

agreed to

If we e an

Clay

t1 Bizon1ari

was

closer con"liacts between

even

zones, esp ec ially since the British Government,

by the Labour Party,

This would

Thus

was

sympathetic toward the SPD in its

pre s ent the Uni ted States with an even stronger push

for socialization in Western Germany .
One of the

early ac tions taken in the o rganization of Bizonia

was the fomation of

an

economic

council, compr ised of German citizens,

to coordina te economic measures in
On J anuary
the

the two

16, 191'7 , the SPD took

zones.

over

the Economic

Council of

Anglo-Americ an Zones by virtue of its strong central party organization.

After gaining control of the Economic Executive Council, the SPD 1 s

first

act wa s to o u st Dr. Ru.dolph Muell e r, a conservative, and repl ace him with
Dr.

Victor Agartz, Schumacher ' s " right hand

man. 11

viewed this move a s a setback to American ide a s
reconstruction should .follow.

90:rbid. 1

P•

224.

91rbid. 1

P•

170.

-

on

German politicians

the course German

All or the council :members were Socialists,

36
b ec au se the center

parties l acked the necessary inter- zonal party structure

to overcome the organiz ational superiority of

decarteliz ation

favored little
the

were similar to tho se of the United States, an d he

socialization. 92

Mueller was

loss of his position, which he claimed

and he decl ared he
block

Agartz favored a

industry and strong trade unions , while 1'1ueller 1 s views

dec artelization of
on

the SFD .

would form

a new

understandably bitter over

wa s a

purely political

move,

anti- so cialist party in Bizonia to

Schumacher. 93
General Cl ay and General Brian Robertso n, the British Military
approve the democratic election of Agartz, but in their

Govemor, had to

message to the Council they informed its members that they believed 1 t
would

be

better if the heads of bi zonal agencie s had a " reasonable

continuity" in office .
j u st c au se .

It one were to be

removed, it should be only for

They said that consul tations would be held to see if their

directive wa s carried out, and they thanked Mueller for
The sub sequent
SPD program

moves

by the Economic Council to

his services. 94
implement the

endangered Cl ay ' s policy of making socializ ation in Geman,y

difficult, ii'

not impo ssible .

maintain the appearance of

Thia did not £aoilitate OMGUS ' attempts to

political neutrality.

The el ec tion o f the

socialist Agartz as Chairll'J an of the Economic Council infiuenced the
Military

Government to m aintain the policy o f assigning as little

political power
since

as

po ssible to the

Gemans, which it had been following

the beginning of tb.e o ccup ation.

9 �.Y. T. ,
9Jrbid. ,
-

94rbid.
-

Thi s policy had

J anuary 17, 1947, P• 5 .
January 19 ,

1947, P • 29 .

been

instituted

37
to prevent

any po ssible resurgeance of N ational So cialism, but by 19 47

there were

virtually

no rea son s

avoided a direc t clash

o ve r

for continuing to pursue it. 9$

socialization and thu s kep t up

Clay

a neutral

by stating that Economic Council enactments did not bind

app earance

Bizonia as laws but were

only recomm end ations.

This soon bec ame offic ial

OMGUS policy. 96
On J anuary

28, 1947, Schumacher confronted all the occupying

powers when he wamed them to consider Gemany at
Mini sters Conference in :¥.o scow.
considered an

isolated c ase but

were a msnber of

that if he

He declared that Germany
as

a fu ture German

each Land were treated
-

a

Schumacher thu s

A connict

Schumacher declared that i.t

wa s

be Genn&ny' 1 S and

in direct oppo sition to .American

£ederal German s tate.

over trade union o rganization in Berlin abou t this

time brought the United States and the SPD into oppo sition.
States wanted to prevent the Soviet backed SEO

9)John Gimbel,
Ibid. , P •

-

that Gemans ,

strong central Reichstag r ather than a weak

as a sovereign state, it would

dec entralized

96

said

He confronted American plans

Laender, or states.

senate representing the

plans tor

He

government and a sked to sign

S chumacher asserted

occupying force s.

for Germany by cal.ling for a

ruin.97

mu st not be

treaty, had to be freely elected by all Germany, not

j u st appointees of the

Europ e ' s

Foreign

a p art or a European problem.

a " too harsh " peace , he would refu se .
who wo uld sign a

the coming

.'.!'.!!!, .American

from taking over

Occupation, P •

119 .

97N . Y. T. , J anuary 29 , 1947 , P • 14.

The United

118.

the

)8
Berlin trade unions,

by strengthening the SPD for the battle .

However,

the SPD did not want the help ,, bec ause it did no t wish t o do anything

split the unions

to

SED claims

on a sec tional. basis , and thu s

that the SPD was splitting the wrlcing cl a s s

the imp erialistic foreign powers.

'Willing to

would be

negotiate

confrontation with the Soviet

Thi s ta ct, combined with the

as

a lackey of

coo,, however, reported that it

The

in the struggle.98

thus still willing to support the SPD

American

seemingly justify

ally in the

as an

Union , but

The United States

was

growing

the SPD wo ul d h ave none of

it.

willingness of the CDU to go along vi.th

policy, did nothing to enhance th e .future of the SPD in its

dealing s with OMOUS .
In mid-March th e C DU

attempted to organize a mee ting of the

various German political p arties to formulate
to the

& scow Foreign Minister • s Conference.

a

joint proposal to submit

Wi thout the participation

of the SPD,, however, the recommendations would carry little

again, Schumacher refused to coop erate fully with the other parties,

Once
as

the United States would have liked.

his conditions,
no t

one

agreed to attend, but only

He

of which wa s that the

on

discussions should be real and

just the ratifying of something impo aed b;y the occup ation powers . 100

Schumacher continued his

its Bavarian
for

weight. 99

independent stance

farmer supporter s for

b1' condemning the CDU and

leaving much of the re sponsibility

l

O
the food shortages in the indu strial areas of We stern Germ 8l'l1 . l

FRUS,

9SBobert Murphy to the Secretary of State , February 12, 1947,
1947, Vol. I I,, P• 8$2 .
99N . Y. T. , March 18,, 1947,, P• 4.

l<Xlrbid. ,

101:rbid. ,,

March 19 ,
March

1947, P • 5 .

31, 1947 , P • 3.

39
received some solace in April when the Bavarian state

OMGUS
legislature

vo ted down the SPD and neu tralized a socialization clau se in

Bavarian constitution.

the

The SPD

was

then eJCP ec ted to withdraw

from

the co alition,, which is precisely what Schumacher had wi sh ed from the
beginning .
los e

The SPD

hoped that

its majo ri ty . 102

new

e lections would

cau se the CSU to

April of 1947 , Cl91 reported to the War Department that the

In

Bizonal Economic Counc il 11:> ul d

naturally have a substantial SPD

Clay a ccused the British of collaborating closely with

maj ority.

Schumacher and supporting his calls for socialization, nationalization of
indu stry,

an

increasingly centralized economy, and a strong central
Cl&,1 reiterated

government.

to American
SPD

plans for

a

his views tha t S chumacher was a danger

decentralized, federal Germacy.

He felt the

majority in the counc il would not reall y reflect the majority of

German opinion.

103

Clay believed the conservative

parties

wo uld be hurt

British propo sal of equal L aender representation,

since the CDU and LDP

( Liberal !)8111.') cratic Party) were concentrated in Bavaria.
would promote

a more proportional representation plan.

had to come up with a workable alternative

or

majority of

to socialiSJ11 ,

The United States

oppo sition to the British

Clay maintained he was no t oppo sed

per .!!i but would only accep t 1 t on a vote or the German

l02t�.Y. T. ,

�. ,

German opinion.

He said he

el se face the prospect

ot accepting aocialiam, or ot being in constant
and the

by the

April 26, 1947, P• 6.

l03aeneral Clay to the War Dep artment,, April 26, 1947,
P• 912.

people, and then only on a Laender ba sis until a central German government

This is p rec i sely what Clay had refu sed to accept in

created.

wa s

the ins tance of Hesse.

Clay stated that

limit soci alistic control s to
maintaining bro ad

as

American policy should be to

few ba sic indu stries as possible, while

principles of free en terprise.

Clay believed

the

German peopl e might support this, since it had been a controlled economic

system which had aided Hitler ' s rise to power.

and soci al

Even before this t ime, Washington had

104

to share Cl ay ' s fe ars

come

of so ci alism and a highly centralized organization of Germany.

Clay

was instructed to reduce the chance of this o ccurring by limiting the
powers of the Bizonal Council and main taining his control o ver its
legislation.

The instruc tions .from Washington said that the council

should have a voice in the determination of production, expo rt-import
level s, and fuel allocation, bu t the Military Oovemors sho uld ke ep
i ts policies
the right
it

under

observation.

The powers of the Counc il did not include

or socialization at the bizonal level .

Washington believed tha t

would be better to keep decision making at the Laender level .

reserved the

Clay

right to control what he believed was excessive centralization

by making critical council decisions subject to the agreement of the
Military

Oovernors. 105
This decision created a si tuation in

which

the United States was

forced to face what its real aims were in its German policies.

Military Go vernors had

l04Ibid. ,
105

P•

kept their

power ot review over council decisions,

913.

John Gimbel ,

.!h!

Since the

American Occupation, P •

126.

4l
th ey co uld have given the Laender more power, in the interest 0£
One wo uld

federalism.

expect that OMGUS wou ld have p u shed tor the

Laender to have more power, to encourage and develop federal struc ture s
tor the Germans to

use onoe the Military Government

11.owever,. granting more power to the Laender would have in creasingl,r

powers.

eight Minister Pre sidents , five of whom were So cial

involved their

The Uni ted Sta tes thu s resisted Laender innuence at

Democrats.

serve on the

job.

Bizonal Exec u tive Commi ttee , bec au se he said it

He al so re.f'u sed to define the exac t

committee members and their home

from the inner workings

wa s a

governmen ts . 106

of Bizonia.

party professionals

The second les sened the powar these

might have over oonmd ttee members.

By re!using to allow

the L aender

to assume a greater degree of power, the United States seemed to be

against its

working

As John Gimbel ha s said, 11 the

concept o r federalism.

own

full

relationship between the

Cl ay ' s firs t deci sion effectively removed SPD

men

the

Cl ay would no t allow the Minister Presidents to

Frankfurt co uncils.

time

gave up its review

containment of so cial demo crats and so ciali• continued to p reoc cupy
Americans •

•

•

• "

107

between the

Uni ted Stat e s and its British

j ust this poli cy in early May.

Victor Agartz had threatened

A confiict developed
ally over

to resign , becau se
his policies.

he claimed that United States au thorities were bl ocking

He even accu sed the United States o.f' refusing to gr ant him

a travel p ermi t in order to thwart hi s
106

�. ,

l07Ibid.

108H
ye T•
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P•

128 .

"
, J:,a:y 6 I

19 4 7 I p • 8 •

activities. 108

11 In.formed sourc e s 11 reported to the New

_

Uni ted S tate s re sented

Bizonia .

American

York Tilll e s that th e

_

_.....,.

Briti sh attemp ts to actively force socialism

on

offi cials once again voiced their "o fficial " line

obj ections to socialism if the German people freely

that they had

no

selec ted it.

F.owever, they felt that the Germans were not 1et ready

to a s sume the p owers inherent in

su ch a system.

United States officials

A.gartz of liking to "play dictator" and of no t understanding

ac cused

OMGUS 1 in si stance on a

slow, evolutionary development of Germany as the

only way to insure the suc ce ss of the American o ccupation.

Americ an

policy m akers were not placing German economic recovery above "world
peace and security, 11 which they accused the Bri ti sh of doing .
resisted a

"quick cure tt for Germany ' s problems.

tha t economic centraliz ation

The United States believed

implied political centralization, and

Germ81'lJ' was not believed to be ready to be tru sted with such
In

Cl ay had

fact, some occupation officials believed it

wa s still

power 1et.

really too

early to have given the Germans the power they ha d alreact¥ been granted.109
Great Britain and

agreement
been.

once

on

the future o f

Bizonia.

socialism in both zones b1 impo sition.

opposed both these concep ts .
drop their plans for

The United States

In return for American conce ssions

aforementioned powers for the co uncil
agreed to

The main points of contention had

again, Briti sh desires for increased powers for the bizonal

and

co uncils

the United States finally reached a comprom ise

over economic matters, the British

so ciali sm ,.

as

far as

Bi.zonia wa s concerned.

This wa s viewe d as a great vic tory for Clay ' s plans for Germany.

109N . Y. T. ,

May 6, 1 947 , P• 8.

llO!bid. , MBY" 19 1

1947 , P• 8.

o n the

110

4J
Sho rtly after the compro mi se b etween the United S ta tes and
Britain, Schumacher began

extended sp eaking tour on which

an

States, and the Soviet Union,

came

under his

increasing

the United

a ttack .

He

bl amed bizonal economic policies for causing the severe food sho rtage
and demanded tha t Germany be allowed to
in order to
export. 11
German

1 11

purchase food imports.

He

Schumacher said, 11Germany mu st

condemned "reckless world politici an s " for mi su sing the

people in a struggle between Zast and West.

"Europe

tha t

export more manufactured goods

He told the Sovi ets

mu st be demo cratic, 11 while he informed the Ameri c ans tha t

"Europe must b e so cialistic. "
to either side

He vowed Germany would no t sell itself

•112

Clo sing t.�e tour at

Nuremberg, Schumacher c alled on the Western

Powers to sp eed the economic reconstruction of Germany a s a bulwark against
Oommunism .

He

said th e economic prosperity of Ge rm any could be of

grea t importance in deciding the develop ing struggle between East and

West.

Schumacher praised the

Marshall Plan and admitted that Europe

had

choice but to accept.

A German collap se would

no

general help c ame soon.
the

The key to the question

dismantling of We st German indu stry.

Germany would have to play the

major

wa s ,

be

ne ar

to

Schumacher,

He still maintained that

role in European

recovery. 113

The SPD again con.fronted the United States in June
the opening of the Bizonal Economic Council .
111,<T
.. . y
... . 'f'
.. . , ¥
i i.Sy 19 ,

1914. 7 • P• 7 •

11 2Ibid. , June 2, 1947, P • 11.
113Ibid. , June JO, 194'7, P• 9 .

unless

Th e

is sue

wa s

shortly after
again

c entraliz ation versus federal i sm .

Th e SPD

obj ected to the 11r1ghte st

tendency11 of sea t distribution in the council.
by the SPD to gain

of Finance .

or

a ttempts

the po sitions of Director of Economics and Director

Thi s conflict stalled the working of bizonal

agencies.ll4

opening of the C ouncil .faced th e United States with two

The

It could either issue direc t

choice s .

The CDU oppo sed

b inding order s to the Laender,

i t could grant increased power to the Germans in the co uncil at

Frankfurt.

!�either choice

was

attractive to Clay.

The fir st

unfeasible due to the growing prop aganda war between

and the

We st.

The second was e ven more

so

was

the 5oviet Union

because th e United States

wanted to maintain control over its heavy financial inve stment in
Germany, continu e the fiction that the Bizonal Economic Co uncil wa s an

a political

economic and not
that the SPD

did not

gain politic ally .

o rganiz ation, and, finally,

to make certain

gain through admini stration what it had failed to

The result was

that no choice was made , but

pol icy

nuctuated. 115
In August, the American military government in Bremen su spended
for

one week the publishing privileges of the lo cal SPD paper .for

viol a tin g an

order to submit all political

However, the

penalty

wa s

material prio r

in o rder to preserve its image

of

p a st.

ll6

Gimbel, The American Occupation, P•

llS�. ,
11�w. v ,.

• •• 6.,

P • 188 .
A· ugu s t

27 , 1947 , P • 10 •

United

The Bremen government,

neutrality, had to

it h a d done it to the KPD in the

ll4John

public ation.

light, bec au se, observers claimed, the

Sta tes believed tha violation was inadvertent.

since

to

impose

186.

some

sanctions

45
meet the increasing prote sts that he was 'WO rking

In order to

against the sPD, Clay explained his po sition to the Laenderrat, the
Counc il or
September

States

9.

as

represen ted

by their Minister Presidents,

on

He cl aimed that much o f what had been said about OMGUS 1

oppo si tion to

socializ ation of indu stry had been "di storted and

inaccurate. "

Cl ay

told the

believed in the tree

Germans

tha t

although the .All1 e rican people

enterprise system which had brought them great

material wall being, they believed even

more

in d81110 c racy.

Therefore,

ac cording to Clay, tmY German state could decide upon so cialism for its
own

area. 117
Clay' s statement was a reaffi rmation or a policy announced

by

the u . s . State Department in August of 1947 which declared that the
United States did no t oppo se demo cratic so cialization as long as
foreign property owners

that Clay

were

comp ensated. US

would have to be

was,

however,

were

a!fected, the soc ialization

app roved by all the German people, whenever a government

or expres sing their

n�tion al

highly indu strialized co untry such
find any

catch

ruled tha t if the socialized indu strie s overlapped into the

other Laender or if people in other areas

c�able

The

will had been established. 119

as

Germany it would be ditticult to

industry tha t did no t arree t the

Laender to s ome degree.

Thus, Clay

lives

of people in other

aad again maintained his "neu tral "

po sition, while e!i"eotively blocking the at.tempts for socialization.
117

N . Y . T. , September

us

u. s.

10 , 1947 , P • 10.

Dep artment o f Sta te , Occupation

U�.I. T, ,

September 10,

In

19471 P • 10.

.2! Germaey,

P•

42.

a
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A

crisis in Bavaria cau sed the end of the co al i tion government

less than a week after Cl ay •
plea sed Cl ay,

s

Laenderrat sp eech.

The r e sults should

have

as the SPD, after ac cusing the CSU of failing to live up

to its end of a bargain

about socialization

measures, left the government.

The f'our SPD members who le.rt the c abinet were

soon

replaced by members

of the csu . 120
During this same month , Schum acher ' s first and only vi si t to
the United States took place where he
L abor convention . 121

a ttended

an

American Federation o t

Schumacher spent three weeks in the United States.

However, hi e contacts were

His

virtually limited to labor leaders.

trade

appo intment book showed n11111e rou s meeting s with Irvin Brown, a

Jay IA:>vestone, a

union l eader, and
Communi st

Party.

o fficial s .

As

a

former executive of the Americ an

He did not get the opportunity to meet with government
result, his

impression of the American government

remained su spicious and hostile, and, it must be admitted, vice versa.
American labor organizations.

The SPD had some support among

U . A. w.

President, Walter Reuther, had criticised United S tates policy
returning to power

122

as

the very people who had helped bring about the war.

He said American policy in Germany wa s a " threat to democracy in
Germany and democracy

in the world. "123

This

was a

point

which Schumacher

had been raising tor almost two years.

12�r .Y.T. ,

l21Ibid. ,
-

12

2.r. ewi s

123navid

So cialism,

September

15, 1947 , p . 6.

S eptember 20 ,
Edinger,

Childs,

191§-1965

�
�

1947, P • 20 .
Schumacher, p.

173.

The Story
3 chuma cher !£. Brandt :
P ergB.lllon Press, 1966},p. 73.

( New York :
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German

47
1947 was fairly uneventful fo r official

The l atter part of

relations between the Unit.ad
Clark of

the !!!!! !.2!!,

States and the SPD.

However, Delbert

Time s stirred up a storm when he accused

Schumacher of calling tor the partition

of Germany , with the westem

portion then to sign

Thi s 'Wt:>Uld have been a sharp

a

separate peace .

reversal in SchW11 acher ' s program, since he had always advocated unity
and nationaliSJ11 .

So much

called his program

"no

so,

in fact, that one

national

sociali sm but social nationalism. "

Clarlc, who said that Schumacher was an
political winds,

expert at shifting with the

claimed the change in

coni'erences Schumacher

American official had

policy came abou t as a result or

had held vi th American officials

his recent

on

trip, and his desire to be the first chancellor of the "Fo urth Reich. 11
The controversy raged

f'or several week s .

It

:finally

end when Schumacher replied 1n a letter to the editor of the
declared tha t Clark ' s
s aid there had b een

no

to

Times.

original article had been completely wrong .

an

He
He

secret ••ting of SPD leaders for him to

institute this "change " in

policy, only the regular meeting of the

Berlin district committee .
stand

c ame

124

In that meeting he

claimed he took the same

as always, th41t was !or a united Germany and against sep aration.

He al so stated he

was

againat

a

separate peace .

charge that he had shifted his po si tion tor
maintained

Final].y1

as

to the

a political gain, Sch1.111acher

that he had always been c riticised in the past for not

shifting gracefully with the winds of po litic al

l�.Y. T. ,

November

6, 1947, P • 10 .

125�. , Dec mber
29 1 1 9 4 11 P • 26.
e

fortune.125

48
1947 ended

on

the omino us no te

of the fail ure of the London

Minister ' s Conference to a chieve any sub stanti al results

Fo reign

regarding Germany.

Some

The talk of partition became more frequent.

Americans, su ch a s John Foster Dulles , hop ed

it would come soon.

sources reported that the SPD and the CDU were

already working

on

Some

a

joint political proposal to submit to bizonal otticial s as a charter
for a West German government.
document before the end of

Clay wa s reported to be expec ting

December. 126

Schumacher opened the new 1ear

by

once

and British o ccup ation .force s for no t granting

Germany.

He

demo cracy in

the

again condemning American
additional powers to

told a crowd at Munich tha t decisions for c ommuni sm or
Germ&niY would be "decided with bread. "

He claimed that the

German

people would become friends of the country that treated them

best.

He believed that the Marshall Pl an would increase the German foo d

supply, bu t the Germana also needed the right to institute demo cracy
tor

themselves.

He felt thi s would be

reduce their function to

accomplished if the Allies would

only the lowest level of control. · Schumacher

closed by attacking wealthJ Germans who he accused of not carrying their
share of the

load. 127

Meanwhile, the United States, realizing that cooperation with
the

Russian s over Germany was now probably impo ssible, be g an to push for

the organization of a West German government.
between th e SPD, l4'lich favored

12�.Y. T. ,

a weakened position of the Laenderrat,

Dece111ber 10, 1947 , P • 2 .

127rbid. , J anuary 10, 1948, P • 7.
-

There was still a conflic t

and the

center p arties, whi ch wanted to have strong federal states.128

The .Americans and British, however,

trJring to settJ.e difference s

were

policie s.

between the p arti es in o rd er to promote their
they agreed to push
since it

was

the public ownership question to the background,

the main issue

In Febru ary

To do this,

separating t.he SPD .from the cru . 129

1948, the SPD protested to American officials the

pl anned vi sit of Dr . Rudolph Mu eller, German economist and political

figure, to the United States .
credits to Europe
aid was

Mu eller had stated tha t Americ an dollar

would only prop up socialist governments unle s s the

given directly to private agencie s.

The SPD told Am erican

officials that what Mueller would s ay in the United States wo uld

pl a;y into communi st hands, since he wa s

a

only

prime example of "ruthless

private c apitalism. "130
The SPD continued to retu se to meekly follow All i ed policy.
became a

It

"wedge" in th e "coo p erative spiri t" th a t th e United Sta tes was

trying to promote .

In ?-'.ar ch it had ref'u sed to

accept governmental

responsibility when the CDU-FDP co alition in the Bizonal Economic
Council

broke up .

The SPD

said it did no t feel it cou ld maintain center

party support and vowed to wage aggressive oppo sition if the cw remained
in

power. 13l

In May the SPD once again s tepp ed

on

the to e s or the

126Robert Murphy to the Secretary of State, J anuary .301 19 48,
Department of State, Foreign Relations .!?! the United States:
Diplomatic Papers, 1948, Vol. I I , Germany and Austria {Washington, D. c. :
u . s . Government Printing Office, 1973) 1 P• 51.
u.s.

12 9.Ambas sador Douglas to the Secretary
1948 , �. , P • 77.

lJ� .Y. T. ,

February 22,

1948, P • J.

lJlibid. , March 2, 1948, P • 7.

of State, February 20 ,

50
.Americans

by joining with he KPD to vote down
t

measure , suppo rted

a

price increase

by the United States.132

Clay remained consistent with hi s previous actions, in that same
month.

On

May 26, the He ssian Landty passed its "works council l aw"

and submitted

it to O!-.OUS for approval.

Clat was bu sy at that ti.Ill e

with the decisions of the London Conference, currency re.tom, and the

growing Berlin crisis.
Rob ert

He wanted to di sapprove the whole act, while

Murphy believed it should be approved.

Clay finally decided to

ac cep t the "personnel and weU'are" pro visions but su spended the
" economic co-detennination " provisions, bec au se they " affected the

commerce between st.ate s. "

technicalit7

Once again Cl ay had used this

to limit the power of the SPD and hind.er its plans for

socialization. 1 33

Nearly tw y e a rs had passed since a,mes • speech a t Stuttgart.
In this p eriod the United Sta tes,

as

p ersonii'ied by General Cl q, and

the SPD had become open antagoni sts.
openly tor a

In June of

major program or socializ ation.

German government which would be able to
SPD saw as Germany • s

major problems.

to be a pawn ot eith e r he West or
t

independent

course

wanted

a

strong central

effectively deal with what the

Finally, the SPD did

no t desire

East but wished to pursue

in foreign polic1.

hand, championed the free

It

1948 the SPD stood

The

an

United States, on the other

enterprise 57stem coupled with federalism,

which it believed would p rovide Gemany wi th the same benefits these
systems had

brought to Americ a.

We st Germany into

l32N.Y. T. ,

OMGUS

alao hoped to integrate a .f ederallzed

a system to contain Soviet expansion.
May 27, 1948, P • 11.

l33John Gilabel,

!!:!!

.Ameri can Occup ation, P • 2 3 2 .
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Wi th such opposing viewpoints, fu rther conflict between the
SPD and OMGUS seemed inevi table.

The London Six Power Confer ence,

which had bee.."1 meeting thro ughout much of the Sprin g of
to m ak e recomm endations which would place the
SPD and the United S tate s in a new arena.

1948,

was

about

ho stility between the

The politic al battle to be

jo ined wa s the debate over the fo unding of a new we st Gennan State.

CHAP TSi1 V
THE UN I T :D ST.AT.ES, THE SPD, AlID THE 1."0UNDING OF THE
WEST GERYLJ s·rATE
The London Conference on Germany was based

on

the

concept that,

sin ce coop eration with the Soviet Union over Germany was unlikely,
We stern powers had to m ake

some

the

definite pl ans for Germany ' s fu ture.

The

final deci sion of the c onfer ence , which was forwarded to the Nili tary
Governors and p a s sed along to the Germans on
e stablishment of
Germany.

a

federal system of states in

The document

unific ation
disrup ted.

11

J uly 1 1 1948, called for the
the we stern p art o f

paid lip service to the hope for eventu al German

when it referred to the situation in Germany

as

11 at p resent

The German Minister Presidents were instruc ted to convene a

11 constitu en t a s sembly " which would adop t

p articip ating state s .

If the constitu tion contained " adequate authority"

and guaranteed individual

rights and freedoms , the Military Governors

would au tho rize it for ratification.
it, it would become

a demo cratic constitution fo r the

If two-thirds of the states approved

binding . 134

Thi s doc ument seems to provide adequate leeway for the Germans
to have
events

a

l arge vo ice in de termining their

reveal ed,

whenever it

own

futur e .

However, as

wa s the independent ideas of the SPD the

Germans wanted, the Uni ted States tried to l imi t

their vo ice.

l.34Richard Sc ammon, 11?o1 i t:Lc a1 P �rti es , 11 in Govern in££ Po st-War
Germany, Vol . II, ed. by ;;;dw ard Li�c hfield ( ?o rt Wa shing ton , New io rk :
K enn ik at P ress , 19 72 ) , p . 51.J.2 .
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It

was no

secret that the West wa s going

German sta te made up

of its Zones .

a constituent as sembly

was

of de sire to assume the
and

Adenauei'f' tel t

division of

to pu sh for a sep arate

Nearly a mon th before th e c al l for

made , the SPD and the CW

responsibility

were voicing a lack

tor its formation.

that the pol1tician who accepted

even

Bo th Schumacher

a temporary

Germany would be hurting himself and his p arty for the

As long as there wa s a chance remaining for a unified Gennany,

fu ture .

they wanted

no

pa rt

of a western state.135

Events were soon to change the German intransigence.

On June

28,

1948 , the Soviet Union implemented a land and water block-1e o f Berlin.
The Cold War was in danger of becoming ho t .

Any hope for a united

Germarl3 in the near future seemed out of the question.
By the .fir st of

it

July,

was reported that the German p arties
However, they tried to maintain

were ready to accep t a West Germ an state.
the app earance of no t fostering sep aration.
demand a change in any occup ation statute

! priori.
an

met and agreed to

presented by the Allies which

did no t proVide tor complete Genn an control
relation s .

The SPD

over

foreign and commercia1

Clay responded that the Allies would not promise llll.Y changed
The SPD also said that the

constituent assembly should adop t

" administrative instrument, no t a constitution , whi ch implied a split

in the co untry which th e SPD

could no t accept. ,,l)6

These propo s al s c ame ou t of a
the S?D and CDU had

meeting at Frankfurt at which both

attempted to decide on in structions tor the Minister

Presidents .tor their forthcoming

meeting at Koblenz.

Source s w1 thin the

p arties reported that agreements were easily reachable on some i s sues,
J.JSN . Y. T. , J une 5 , 1948 , P • 6.

l36:rbid. ,
-

*

July

B, 1948, P • 8.

Konrad Adenauer

wa s

the

leader of the CDU .

such a s a federal
supreme court.
of

state , civil rights gu arantees , a nd the powers of a

54

However, there were differences over the relative powers

the central and Laender governments , and over p ropo rtional representation

versu s single constituency representation.

The SPD wanted to deal with

far reaching matters, while the COO wanted to deal wi th

only the basics,

Both p arties exhibited a desire to

and tru st the rest to the Allies.

accep t sovereignty, which they felt could solve many of Germany • s problems.

However, they still did no t

want to take the chance o! permanen tly

severing the Soviet Zone from their new atate. 137
At a meeting of SPD members, Carlo Schmid, o n e o f Schwnacher •
atdU, declared its main goal was the unifi cation of Germaey.
accep t a we st German state only a s a temporary solu tion .
sta ted

previously 1

even

s

chief"

It would

However, as

this wo uld be unacceptable under a dr aft of the

occupation sta tute which gave
internal policy to the Allies.

control o ver foreign trade and related
More moderate party manbers , such a s

Wilhelm K aisen, believed that Germany should seize every
within the Frankfurt proposals

to extend its sovereignty.

opportunity
Ou tright

oppo sition to Allied propo s al s should be replaced with counter-propo s al s .

All factions agreed tha t whatever document was p roduced
it should no t be called a

con s tituti on. 13 8

The SPD was reluctant to
the call for

a

FRU S ,

�. ,

support the 1''r ankfurt propo sal s in which

constituent a s sembly

it was not due to

a

by the Germana,

was

included.

rear or sanctioning the split

Murphy believed that
of Germany, as the SPD

13 7Robert ¥rurphy to the Sec retary o f Sta te, July 8, 1948 ,
1948, Vol . I I, P • J82 .

lJBRobert Murphy

P•

JBJ .

to the Sec re tary o f

State, July 9 , 1948,

SS
claiMd.1 but
granted to

reeult of the

was a

0emany. ll9

'lb• coo ,

laok ot aovereignty,
on

govemment. 140

an

Adcau• stated that the p ropo•al•

excellent

opport\mitl to shap e their

own.

'!'he SPD and the United. States wve no t drawing flt1Y cloaer

together, but tbe CW

Ci.roles

near

vaa

standing right 'b7 the United Statea • aide .

to Cla,y pri vatal.7 advised the SPD to accept the

Frankfurt pmpoaala, beoeu• if they did not,, they would.

get leaa.

the SPD aav it,

the other hand, favored fill h
t e

"po sitive" aapecta of the propo sals.
offered the German people

as

'fhe SPD was told it

reoognhe the apli t of <lertna'l1
the

legal h•gallnl

new

govemmet

over

eventually onl,y

time for '-he Ger.mm parties to

wa s
as a

.ta�

It

waa

alao advised to a'ft>id.

eovenigntT, a:tnoe wutever they eaU.ed the

document, it vould. be il'anal.ated into ingliah

as a

•conatitu tion. "141

Clay •t with the Minister frealdeata of t.he American Zone
July

14 and warned tbaa that by del.811nl encl objecting to the F:rank.t\lrt

p:ropo NJ.a, th81 were
no

on

btu't1ng tbeir

own

Olay ""1nded them that

cav.ee.

matter what "'91 cU.41 they would be accuad

they should 1et

about to build

the potential tor full economic
Minister Pnaidenta

require

new

were

••

stana

rctco'tV1•

informed

a

1tate

At

a

ae waa

poae:lbl.e with

later 111Mting the

t.hat further poe�n..-ita llight

deciaions bf the .All ied. govel'me\tl

0.l'lllal1 self govel'nlNnt. 142

of divlding Gemany, eo

and .S.lay' the

Cl.97 belie'fed the SPD

••

cauH

ot

reep:maible for

139.li!S!·

140rud. , P • 384.

�d.
llaaerbert

1942:1220 (Na

Fe1s, From Tru st to Terror:
Th• Oneet of the Cold War,
York : w.w;'"NOrton, i97oJ, P • 367;-

S6
"di stinctJ.y irresponsible

"moves on the

the del ays, and he felt the SPD wa s
the to tal European

at

disregarding the seriousne s s of

situation.143

Minister Pre sidents and the Military Oovemors met once

The

again

part of the Germ ans in c au sing

Frankfurt on July 26, 1948.

The

stormy one, which almost broke up several

meeting was a long and
time s .

I t was marked by

nUlll erou s recesses and pauses for discus sions among the Military Govemors.
Finally, the

Military Govemo rs agreed to accept a Grundgesetz,

They also a greed to .forward the

to be tran slated as the " Basic Law. "
Mini ster Presidents recommendations
In

to their governments.
the elec tion

Law.

144

for the

on

return , the

time schedules and boundary changes

Minis ter Pr esidents wo uld conduct

constituent a s sembly which would draft the Basic

The Germa n s had littJ.. e choice in the sumer
the We stern

no t

Allies ' proposals.

help ing German recovery.

l e a st gaining a chance to

p roduce anything
difficult

which was

worse

It

was

of 1948 but to accept

evident that the statu s quo

By joining with the West, they

try something new.

were

The resul ts could

than they already had.

was
at

hardly

The choice was p articularly

for the SPD, which still held fast to its policy of' Einheit

Freiheit ( Unity and Freedom ) and would

have

preferred to deal with German

domestic p robl em s witho u t interference from E ast or

West. lLS

However, a s

Kurt Schuma cher had admi tted o n several occ asions, for Germ&n¥

"Ea s tern al ternative0 was nonexistent.

143John

Gimbel ,

_!!!!

144�. , P • 222 .

lh5Ibid. , P • 224.
-

�

the

The SPD co uld sid wo uld deal

.Ameri can O ccup ation, P •

216.
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with the terms and condi tions of Germany ' s

place in Eu rop e , but events

had made the op tion for the l'iest unavoidable. 146
Th e SPD issued its p ublic acceptance o f the London Conference
decisions sho rtly after the meeting at

Frankfurt.

It decl ared it

accepting them because they were 11 a step forward. n

The 3PD cl aimed

that, al though it had many obj ec tions , the We stern propo sal s
than anything offered by the Soviet Union.
p ay for

unity with Germ any • s freedom. 147

It wa s now

was

The SPD

wa s

better

were

not willing to

The groundwork had been l aid.

time to begin the ac tu al construction o f the Federal Republic .

The period from Augu st o f

l9L.8 until Hay o f 1949 saw

a tremendou s

number of meeting s between Germans , and between Germans and occupation
The p urpo se of the meeting s

officials.

new German government.
follow

was, o f course, to formulate a

During this p eriod, the SPD

continued to

policy more indep endent from American control than did the

a

other p arties,

and this naturally resulted in continued oppo sition

from the United States.
A preparatory constitutional committee, appointed by t he �1in1 ster
Presidents ,

assembly.
powers ,

met in mid-August to finaliz e pl ans for the

constituent

Robert :!-Iurphy repo rted that the United States, and the o ther

were

maintaining a ''hands offll attitude towa rd the 'WO rk o f the

commi ttee, and trying not to emphasize the importance
On September,

of its task.

1948, the Parliamentary Counc il , as the

as sembly wa s called, opened its meetings at Bonn.

There were

148

constitu ent

sixty-five

146 John l{axwell , Soc ial Democra c;y:, P• 272 .
147N . Y. -1' . , Augu st 1, 1948, P • 5 .

�.t

14BRobert Hurphy to the S ecre tary o f Sta te, August 1 3 , 1948 ,
1948, Vol . I I, P • 414.
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members from the eleven West German Laender.

The

fairly evenly divided, w1 th th e SPD and CDU each
The co un cil

an

the

sea ting

advisory role.

of .five

Thi s

move

The Parliamentary Council

overwhelmingly

delegates from blockaded We st Berlin, in
was promp tly

KPD, which condemned the Co uncil for
seemed

having twenty-seven members.

call ed for the 11 rebirth11 of Germany under the banner of

n.rre edom, law, and peace . "
appro ved

political makeup was

followed by

a protest from the

splitting Germany. 149

Thi s act

only to further empha size the necessity of the Council t s ta sk .
The future

political diVi siona 'Whi ch would exist in th e Federal

Republic cropP ed up shortly after the P arli amentary Council
One of the first is su e s

convened.

which brought the SPD and the CDU into confrontation

was the i s su e of representation in the second house of the federal
p arliament.

The SPD was supporting a plan for a " refined form " of

proportional repre sentation, while the conservative s

which called for a single constitu ency
no

offi cial comment

that a group
whi ch was

on

maj ority

were

vote.15°

backing a plan
OMGUS had

this controversy, but it is interesting to note

of United States senators, including J. William Fulbright,

touring Germany voiced oppo sition to the concept of

representation.

proportional

Fulbright believed that proportional representation would

cause splinte r groups and l«>uld play into the communist • s hands.

He

recommended that Robert .L a.Follette assist the Germ ans in drafting their

constitution.l5l
Secretary of State, September l , 1948,

149Robert

Hurphy to the

l.SORobert

Murphy to the Secre tary of Sta te , September 23, 1948,

�. ,

P•

415 .

�. ,

P•

424.

l5libid. , P • 426 .
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Adenauer had to report to Robert

Murphy in November that the

prime obstacle to the e arly formation of

a German go vemment wa s the

inability of hi s party to reconcile its views with tho se 0£ the SPD . 15 2
As i f to emphasi ze his p oint, the SPD

promptly led the vote again s t

electing a Bunde!P rasident before the unification of all Germany.
The SPD mo tion also

criticised all i ed interference and said the

P arliamentar:r Council would carry o ut its work
people.

153

In

as

mandated by th e German

Dec ember, Carlo Schmid, a leading SPD member in the Council,

told Murphy that the pril!Jary concern of hi s party wa s how much control
the o ccupying powers would maintain below the federal level.
wamed Murphy that

Schmi d

if the West really wanted a demo cratic Germany, it

would have to cease interfering at all levels and in all fields as it
doing.15 4

had been

Schmid revealed one or the main

reasons for the

SPD ' s oppo sition to federaliBDI when he s aid, 1•Wb.ile federalism all over
the world

implies the uniting o f what wa s separated, it i s apparently

intended in our case to separate what had

already been united.

•

•

•

"155

Thi s difference of opinion over the meaning or "federalismtt would be a

problem throughout the negotiations f'or the Basic Law.
The

SPD 1 s desire for independence antagonized American o fficials .

In February, one OMGUS o fficial wa s quoted as

continued to grow, i t is po ssible that

152.
t�emorandum o f

November

!lli• 1

241 1948, !lli• 1

a

saying, "Lf national iSlll

the So cial Democrats 111ay e spouse

meeting with Konrad Adenauer

P•

424.

by Robert Murphy,

l.$)Robert Murphy to the Secretary of Sta te , November 231 1948,
p . L4 7 .
l54Robert Hurphy to Hi ck s , Dec em ber 18 , 1948 ,

�. ,

155John Gol ay, � Founding of � Federal ;tepublic
( Chicago : The University o f Chicago-Press, 1948) , p . 42 .

P•

2.f

663 .

Germany
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it

to COI!tplete power in th e p ropo sed We stern German state

a s a means

instead of

forming

a

government in coali ti.on with the Christian Democ rats.

have socialist nationalism instead of national so ciali sm. 11

Then you would

A second official

quick

wa s

to jump onto this train of thought and

party" organizations to group s which the Nazis had

COIT\'.> ared SPD 0extra

uaed. J.S6
The three
on February

16,

doc ument, but he

.Military Governors considered

1949 .
was

government and did

Clay s tates tha t there wa s general approval of th e
still concerned tha t it provided too much central

no t

di stinguish clearly enough between the powers and

responsibilities of the Laender
asked for

a draft of a Basic Law

time to 1'urther

and tho se of the federal

con sider

points to w hich Clay objected

1t. l57

governmen t.

He

One should no te that the

were preci sely the ones

Cl ay believed that the federal gove:mm ent

was

the SPD suppo r ted.
given too ?lJU ch

draft 0£ the Basic Law over public health, welfare , labor,

power in the

and the pre s s, which had been specifically excluded by the London Conference .

particularly disturbed ove r what he viewed a s excessive

Clay wa s al so

revenue rai sing powers

would de stroy
This

given to the

federal government$ which he

the independence of the

believed

states. 158

last concept caused considerable dissension among the

Military Go verno rs .

Finally , C l ay w a s able to attain a compromi se which

allowed the !ederal government considerable powers, but al so l e.ft

l56rJ.Y. T. ,

February

16, 1949, P • 7 .

l571ucius D . Cl ay , Dec ision .!!!,
Company, 1950), p . 421.

Do ubleday and

l5Sibid.
-

Germ8!1Y

( Garden City, New York:
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tax p owers to the Laender

suffici ent

indep endence .

so

to provide their financial

as

The feder al government wo ul d only be allowed to l egislate

in matters which affected two or more sta tes.
to the Parliamentary Counc il for its
Schumacher

The

Co uncil .

Thi s p roposal

wa s

acceptance.159

oppo sed Cl ay • s compromi se p ropo sal to t he P arl iamen tary

reason

for his oppo si tion was

federal government ' s financial

no t only the le ssening of the

powers , i t wa s also " a qu estion

thing s a sta te needs first in order to become a real state. 11
the CDU wa s
it

willing to compromi se with Clay

wanted a loo se confederation of

Germany. "

presented

German

on

He said

the p ropo sals, bec ause

states, "not

He a ccu sed the COO of pa ndering to

of all the

a

viable

:·lest

French intere sts in

an

attempt to follow its tttraditional politics of clerical partic ularism. "160
The P arli amentary Council took the p ropo sal under consideration,
but the revised Basic Law draft

which it later submitted still did no t

reduce the

central govern.�en t • s po wers over financial ma tters enough to

suit Clay.

The Germans were informed that the amendments did not meet

the sp irit of Cl ay ' s p ropo sals, and they were a sk ed to reconsider.
blamed the intransigence of the SPD for the failure to achieve
The SPD wanted to submi t the draft
witho ut Americ an app roval.

a comp romi se wa s necessary.

of the Basd.c Law to

�. 1

l6o

This pu t moves toward

P • 422 .

John l1axwell , So ci al

161tucius

agreement.

pl enary session

The CDU would no t agree to this, and said
a

standstili. 161
159

a

an

Cl ay

� cracz.,

Clay, Dec i sion

p.

234.

!!:! Germany, p. 424 .

govern.�ent at a
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The Allied For eign Ministers, meeting at Wa shington in

1949 ,

attempted to overcome the deadlock by info rming

Council , via the Military Governo rs ,

Council l«:> uld soo n adopt

l egi slative matters,

transmitted a brief, two
co uncil ' s approval .
provided

that they hope d the P arliamentary

given liberty of ac tion in

exc ep t in

a

few reserved fields .

Clay believed thi s

wa s concemed, to lead a viable state.

major

topic of discussion was

They al so

was a great document which
as

162

naturally the Basic Law.

publicly anno unced hie intent to resist the changes

far as he

Schumacher had

in the Basic Law

Clay believed. SchUI11a cher wanted increa sed

centralized control in order to

more ea sU, �lernent

mea sure s af'ter the government was formed .
Allie s in the matter

of

Allies. 0163
Cl ay wanted to determine

soc i aliz ation

I r Schumacher co ul d

the Basic Law,

to victory at the polls as the "de.render

of

suc ce ssfully

Clay feared he could ride

the Germ an

j ust how committed

p eople against the

Ame rican policy wa s

to a dec entralized Genn an government, so he contacted hi s

Washington.

The

Military Governors and to support its adoption

wit.bou t any amendm ents.

defy the

administrative

April 20, the SPD met in its annu al party congress.

as advoc ated by the

superiors in

He received word that the United State s was interested in

162Ibid. , P • 4 2 8 •
-

163

Ibid. , P •

-

the

and one-half page occupation statute for the

the German government all the powers 1 t needed,

On

The foreign

letter to the Council whic h stated that

West German go vemment should be

and

P arliamentary

a Ba sic Law in the London spirit.

transmi tted ano th er

mini s ters

the

April of

4.31.
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the p rompt fo rm ation o f a We st German government, hopefully withou t much
sacrifice of federaliz ed structure .

on with the Ru ssians in Berlin
for a

were

The secret negotiations being carried

the

c ause

of the

United State s '

desire

prompt agreement in Bonn . 164
foreign ministers in Washington had written

The

a second no te for

tran smis sion to the P arliamentary Co uncil ·whenever the ?··lil i tary Governors

deemed it appropriate .

The l etter had given in somewhat to the Gennan

po sition on financial powers for the c entral government.

was unwilling to forward

However, Clay

the vo te to the Council , becau se it wo uld app ear
He denied that the .American p ol icy

as a moral victory for S chumacher.

"neutrality" had changed,, bu t 11in thi s instance the CDU favored feder al
165
government, which wa s also Tripartite policy . 11

of

Much to his surprise,, Clay was instructed to forward the letter.
He warned Washington that it would lead Schuroaeher to conduct a camp aign

on an anti-occupation platform.

Clay did no t want thi s bec au se it might

fo reseeably lead to an SPD Vic tory.

However, he was able to circumvent

the effect of the order, by wai ting till afte.r the SPD congress to forward
it.

Clay a chieved hi s de sired results .

Although Schumacher rec eived

strong personal support from the SPD congre s s, its final declaration
called for di scussions to nego tiate
Clay finally

transmitted

a."ll endments to the Basic Law; when

the l etter on April 23 , the parties were

negotiating, and the letter lost mu ch of its politi cal impact. 166
affair

wa s

bu t

ano ther example in

a long line

already
This

of Clay ' s intervention.

64
On
compromi se

April 24, the SPD and the CDU reached, in p rinciple;
on

the Basic Law.

They planned to submi t it to the Military

Governors at Frankfurt the next day.
would be acc epted.

The qu estion

on

wa s

April 25.

was

whether

not it

or

only ratifi cation and plenary sessions

Ir it were,

would be nece s s ary before the birth of a

Cl ay

a

German

new

the spokesman for the l'fldli tar1

state. 167

Govemors a t the meeting

He reiterated to the Gennans that he and hi s col leagues

were still di ssatisfied with the bro ad powers the Basic Law granted to the
in legal and financial matters.

.federal government
after di scussion,

unwill ing to make further changes.

were

Clay in a difficult po s i tion .
wa s in hi s

This left

He believed the ex.tent of federalization

hands, because the French had agreed to accept whatever he

might dec ide.

He told the Germans that he

mini sters ' instructions
agreement

However, the Germans,

we re

as

no t reached

well
soon,

as

wa s

trying to m eet the foreign

m ee t th e German s ' viewpoint.

If

an

the Military Govemors would be forced

to go back to their governments tor

mo re

instructions.

Clay then

offered a compromise which wo uld allow th e federal government to raise
taxes for educ ation, heal.th, and welfare , and to
states which could

no t do it themselve s.

thi s compromi se , and the

The

make grants to those

Germans .finally agreed to

major obsta cle to acceptance of the Basic Law was

eliminated. 168
On May

8 , 1949 , the M:ilitarJ Governors approved, with reservations,

the Basic Law !or Germany, and the Federal Republic was bom.
think that, as far

as

might

the United States was concerned, fu ture Germai

167N . Y. T . , April 25 1 1949 , P • 7 .

168tucius

One

Cl ay,

Decision

..!!! Germany,

P•

433.

6$
internal political m atters wo uld
B.owever,

this was not to be the

not be a subj ect for American policy.
case.

Republic a s the culmination

Clay viewed the founding of the Federal
of his work in

Gennany, and he viewed Schum acher, who oppo sed Clay ' s plans

for West Germ any, as unfit to become its leader.169
departure in mid-May, his

character of the SPD .

occupation o fficial s Schumacher ' s b ehavior
and

Up

Clay' s

continued to distrust the

su cce s so r s

" authoritarian " and 11nationalistic 11

Even after

wa s

To American

"irrational, paro chial ,

increasingly threatening to United States ' obj ectives in

Germany. "

until the ".Jest German national elections, the United States believed

it wa s neces sary to frustrate the SPD ' s drive for power, if American
intere sts were to be pro tected.

170

Schuma cher ' s main theme in the election campaign during the
of

1949

wa1

the failure of

summer

the policies of the Economi c Counc il , controlled

by the CDU, which he claimed had caused

l. J million unemployed, high

prices , low wages , and had only contributed to the wealth of the we althy.
Unfortunately for Schumacher and the SPD ,
The August

wa s

not strong eno ugh.

l4 el ec tions showed the CDU winning 7, 357 , 579 vo tes to

61 9 32 , 272 for the SPD.
for the CDU in the
held by

the issue

This was translated into

Bunde sta�, 139 to lJl.

an

the other smaller parties. 172
169tewis Edinger,

� Schumacher,

170Ib1d.
-

p.

186.

l71
John Maxwell , Social Democ ra cz, P • 274.
l72N . Y. T. , August 16, 1949 , P • 29.

eight seat advantage

The balance

171

of power would be

66
American o fficials anno unced the United S tate s would give strong
support to the new con servative government which they hop ed would be
formed

as

a result of the elec tions.

victory was a Victory for

a

They were sati sfied that the CDU

republic whi ch would become a strong ally of

the " demo cratic powers " in the struggle
coalition between the G DU and
the SPD , and

for

Zurop e .

Official s b elieved a

FDP would be much ea sier to deal wi th than

a government ba sed on free enterprise would

more sympathy in the United States than

one

based

on

aro u se

much

socialism.173

Newsweek Magazine reported tha t the government resulting from

the general elections wo uld be
and eco nomic liberalism.

on

the side of political conservatism

The magazine claimed

that .!;:!!

enterprise

had " sp arked Gennany • s remarkable economic recovery " and the CDU victo ry
seemed to off er

mo r e

progress for Germany, plus a government which

the United States would find more to its liking than one dominated by the

SPD. 174

� echoed

o fficials were

this

same feeling , stating tha t .American occup ation

pleased with the election re sults and hoped Adenauer and

the CDU would be suc ce ssful in governing Germany.
Fortune

175

Magazine, a ttcheerleader" for the American free enterprise

system, was exuberant in its praise of the elec tion results.
that

It cl aimed

all that the German people had given up by rej ecting the SPD was

"central planning"

at

home combined 'With "rampant nationalism. n

J.<"ortune

believed that the increa sed innuence of the Catholic Church, which would
l7.3Ibid.

l7�ewsweek,
175�,

August 22 ,

August 221

1949 , P • 29 .

1949 , P • 18 .
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be

one

result of the C:JU vic to ry,, would be

a

stabilizing in.fluence

Germany, and th., economic policies of the CDU,

on

fo rm ulated in l a rge part

by econo.u st Ludvig Erhard, would bring continued 'Jerman prosperlty . 176
The liberal public ation , The N ation,
It believed the conaervative victory would
re surgence

eventually brtng about

on

account of the preference it had shown toward

right throughout the occupation.

CI1J "R>uld eventually 1ose popularity tor its

the SPD

a

of mili t..an t nationaliS?ll of Nazi variety and. blamed the

United Sta tes tor this
tbe Geman

deplored the cw victor,y.

,!h! N�tign

"collaboration" with the

t!light ult:L"ll atel.y benelit by putting in

oppo sit:ion.177

beli eved that the

a

;rear

or

twt> in

ott1c1al CMJUS weekl y

news

bull etin heralded the victory ot

the CDU in the national elections

as a

victory

The

l'e00 ff1'7 of the Gema."1 ecol'lOllJY

waa

economi st Ludwig Erhard and its
as a

Vindication of Erhard '

a

for • tree economy.

credited. to the p0liciea of

elec tion reault.a

were

viewed

policies by the Geman people.

believed tha t the 10cialization qll e$tion WQUld. die down
the outcome of the

C:JU/CSU

by OMQUS
It

wu

result ot

el.ection. 178

The SPD had hint.ad that
"greet coalition, " it it
to

a1 a

The

were

it would be willing to participate in

given the

Ministry or Econoldca and al.la-ad

implement its soci alist program, but Schmacher kept waiting for

Adanauer to make the fir st

176:.ortune

lltOVe .

When the two f1nall 1 did "°et

on

Magazine , Oc tober, 1949 , P • 72.

l77'l'he Nation, August 21 1946, P• 165.
-

l7S

a

John �'U.liott, " Vic to ry for r-�ree �:.Cor.v.>.l?l:f Porces, 11 >:ili tag
Government Intom.ation Bulletin , Sep tembe r 6, l9L.9 , p . 3 .
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Sep tember 10, it
Heuss,

was

for

Adenauer to

announce

hi s support or Theodor

member of the Free Democratic P arty, for F eder al President.

a

Schumacher later sta ted that economic di.:f'ferenoe s had prevented a
coal ition, but

one

might have

been po ssible if a moderate o r left wing

CDU mmber had been in control of the

party. 179

Schumacher then made it cle ar that if the center-right hoped to
govern , it would have to find
tes t came

on

majo ritie s on every issue .

the vote .for Federal President.

candidate of the SPD for the po st, and the
question twice before

The first

Schwaachar was

the

Bundesta& had to vote on th&

Heuss .finally received a majority.

lleuss then

promp tly nominated Adenauer for the po st of Chancel,l.or o f the Federal
Republic.

Schumacher

September
po ssibl e

wa s once

again

15, 1949, Konrad Adenauer

the alterna tive c andidate.
won

majority, 202 votes to 201.180

On

the po st by the slimme st

One vote had thus insured the

continuation of American supported policy in the

new

We st German state.

The Americ an system of federalism and private enterpri se was to have
the chance to solve the problems of po st-war Germany,

l79John Maxwell, Soc ial Demo cracy, p. 281.
180Ibid. , P• 282 .

not the SPD.

fBI HOMI

AMERICAN JlODSTIC ATTI. 1.VDIS

l'IDNT:

'lt>WABD TD SPD
In

W'ubing11on ,
1:be

of go'f1R'DlfMlft \•

OMOUS

p0:Uc1

vas

fol'llUlatecl 8y the var.lout b�1

8\ate and War D1pu1:mmta 1d. tlUn the lb:ecutiw lbwl.cht
negative attitudes toward the

mmbers

ot

SPD

1merall.1 YOi-4 \>1 1ndi'V1du al e ld.thin tbeN branches.

was

add1 t.ton,
were

so

torih.

OMOUS•

In

·

newepaper colweis'8, 1ntell eotuala, end 1ntl.u•t1al poupa

1.natnnaentel 1n the fo1"111ns of opinion neanift toward the SPD.

1.'here
the

Coft&N'A, md

vu

allO

a

8Hll group of 3oum.:l.iate •4 intelleo ta a1 s who RPPO :ated

SPD and iu objee'1wa.

Some ot the attt.tudea ot 'bo'tm poups 'td.ll be

aaine4 1n thi• obapw.
John
HTCll"el

Dul.lea

loner Dull• , who eer'V'ed •• a

adllin1 .Wa'1ona, oppoeecl t.w ot the SP.01 s Mjor

vas

'ltd.cm could al t1Mtel.1

He

wa

adYiaor to

.....

ru-.t,

i11*1l'l•t eoci.Uh\ion1 whi&h he el.aimed eald. deatl'OJ
He belieTed aooiaU&eti.on � "inaulation•

OeNmT ' a -.tab11itr.
Dull.es

toHtp poliv

pr.mint the tmU;1 ot W.stem

not in favo r

of tM SPD' a drive tor

Bmrope.181

Seoondl.1,

Mntral.Ued German 1tate.

a

bel1ued that 11cteoentral.i1ation" offered \be aolaUon t.o the ttaerun

Problem, • an4 be celled tor the

Oompay•

18l.4o1m J'oll ter J>ulln,
USO), P• 220.

Lf!'IMls

!S:

to

11:..,

,u P9ace
.

69

a

(lw

"large •MW:'e ot

rows

Maoaillan eel

10
political. autonony. n

D\lll. es declared that the t1n.1kcl States •• in taie

pold.tion of ·J)O'tfel' 1n \feetem o......,. and lt ldlOuld illpo •

a

tedera11-. l8a
Aa

CHJtJS and
:1n
•

the State
In

DepU"tllent,

t�

DepU'tlltct,

However, for

a

need to

e

eoc1&1.1at desert. -183
the heed ot the PoU.07 Pl.amd.ng Di"fiaion vi th1n

hopes

'bu4'd. Ida

et wtd.a • om.ted

o.m.;,

agatrin 1tte SPD• e plans trw ooiaUuM.on

e

George r. lane,

1arope,

was

h had onoe eall td a. � am. ot Coetlpati.on

"oapitali.et o•IWi• 1tl

tederal

ot

lHfltioned. prev.2.oual.1', Bobart Murphy, who wae the lilll.aon bet.Mn

Otnaany.

t.he state

ayatem

1lo

1*'1ome

•

o.i.....r would

a

ww_

'be • utearal pan.

w'bel' ot thi• new eV.t\Ue ab.fl would

�

ttvidan h8l' hori.Mu•

tor aum.,• • f\l1m'e upon

lW'ft1r

lincu1atic ed. nationtl Umita.184

WhUe l,emm • a poaltd.on ••• not d.Ueot:b' oppoMCl to \b.e SPD, it did
oont.lict nth Sob18Mhu1 • deai1"9 t.o Hbuil.cl

�

naUonal na\e betor• di••atna feclenU• tor

saom.17

ot

into

a

lbrope.

atrong

St.te Dten Aoheaoa, wm had oa'U.ed th• Geman nft1.onal

electtone in vb1ob tee cm o'b�
encl oomon aense , .W

a

plar.Utf'

a

"Tictory

fer moderation

was � ou'8poke 1n b.1a cl"iticlslll or the SPD

Ind its leader, Kun hbumaob.er.

In his

meetings with Manaur and Schumacher.

llell!Oil'e he baa deaonbed his ftrn

B4t Wl'Oie tha.t he ••• struck by tM

l 82John Foster .Dulle a, "luop• Must
hderlte or Pena,. •

Vlffl "'9!m .!£ !.!!! Bit. XllI (Fel>rt18J7 11 1947) 1 t)6.

Y ns
Jt.'ls!m::es& 111£!19£! (GaNen CU:q, ·- e

M'urpby,
Dotableda7 aild Conlp..,, lt6k

183-ot:tat

and

181&.aeorce 1.

Co•&nJ),

P•

!&17.

l ennan.,

,

P•

J2(J.

�fl 622S:\!1Q ( Boston.a

Little, Btovn

lS.Sstatem$nt b.r Secretary of State Acheson, August 16,. 1949,
Department ot State, �
� � in
O vernmentg o?Hce;-IJ;OT, p�IS.
(Wubington, n. c. 1 u.s. O

u . s.

M>�*

�;;eni!
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"im� er1.d w:Lsdo•• ; ot Adenauer• s approach, tdd.oh held the integraUA:m
ot � :Into Western

IltNpe above

arq

plans tor re-unification•

.Adenmer • s wordt g•ire Aohe11JOn •hope tor a new dq 1n Jturope. wl86

Contrast the above opinion of .&ttenauer with Ach•IOft ' • .tir ei

1-pression ot �. whom he c alled
Schumacher • • attack

aggressive. •

ooo up a'1oa va a
ot

•cuft7ing

nationalistic and

Adenauer for working with. the

viewe4 vi th diapa\ b7 Achemn.

f8't'Gr"

He accused the SPD

vlth the Buuiana end "1le wt.n by •baiting the

Die W•tern Powers had ••rificed too auoh, ecco:rd.1ng to

occup ation . •
Acheeon, t;o

on

•hershl.y

be pl.,-.d. ott 11a1net the lusld..,,. 1'>7 the Oel'JWla.187

Seoreta7 ot Detanae J' ... FornaW. decried. what be believed
were

Britiah att.pte to pl.'Omote socialia in Biaord.a.

le

felt that the

eatabli� ot the 11.IOUl !oonom1 c Council, in w.bich tha SPD held
•'1ori'1'1 could lead to eooiaU.satton.

�•\11 aue llted that ti18

i.r1tiah ahotll.d he tolcl that thq ld.&ht lose Meri.can economic aid

paabecl

too bard tor

propoae to Aav9 ""
our om

ideaa.

•188

IOGi.U.S•'tllon.

there
Thia

vaa one

was

it thel'

Jbnntal stated that "w did no"

llOM7 uaed to 1mpl_.t

In �·• then

a

a

little sptJC1t1c

a......

qst.- aonV.17 to

d1-.s•on ot the SPD, bu�

eorud.atent voice ot oppoai t1on towal"d the Genan socialiata.

was Conifts811erl John Sadoweki ot MloM.aan, the l'flprttaentati.ve ot a

72
predom:1Mn\11 Polish district.
SChumacher
�.

as a

danger to the United States ' plane tor

called Sohmaaeher

He

U Garm any were "an
always

a

"Pan-Oe1'111111 1r and

a

was

certain Germany' 1

war

potential

This con cem. ovw th•

a

le closed hie

001111.d:tie• iftveatigatlon to -*•

had been oo.ple'telf des� 189

SPD

was

:indicated.

on

th•

other sicle of

demam4'd that CHIUS preaerve a •beaobbead ot private

enterprlae• in Wutem Gcmn.tn.y .
1947 during an

This

"'*'*• 11hich

App l'Dpri•tii.ons Oomnd.ttM �

agreamct on bieonal. eoonolld.ea and i'inlflCft,

e�,

with the Jritiilb

to

ot the

watohi.ng.

Hill b7 the acMone or Republioe S.. to rs Ball, Knowland, and

Ferguson, who

•-•

fanatic whc> acted aa

a

�ok the Great., B:l.aa:rek, t.he Kaiser, Hitler, •ma

condanna iion of the SPD by calling to-z

h

demoo ratie

readl' to remrt to brutal aggruaion.

Sohumaob�1 • who Sedowek1 said would bear

Capitol

a

Sadoweki olailted that there wa

innocent 'ri.r&in. "

Oemm leadeJ! who

'l'here bad bem
1'01'

1.n Jttlt, 1941,. Sadowaki condel!D.ed

b.tokin&,

was

on

c..

in Deoamber of

tbe Analo-Amerl.can

the reeult of a fear thlt

would be able to block American

re-eetablleh tn4t enterpr:Lae in the ooabined sous.

SecretQ7

knfr Willi• Draper u&recl the oOJld.�tee that the United Statee

110uld never

allow Roh

decided tor

1t

a

thing to h-- unleaa the Gtmlan people had

democra�oaUT.uo

OUMide QDVenmtent eirol•• in the United Ste• tnere ••• al•
strong opposition to the

sPD.

B'.al"l

Brm.d.t,

Who had aerwd 1n Geman,r vJ.th OKGUSt

a

a.me born eoortollliat

voiced bia 4ifaptHMD\ with the

13
SPD' a socialistic objeet.ivea.
econon17 waa

Brandt

raaintained. that 1t the German

to be aalvaged at all , the "d1•rediwn toaoept ot

aban.6oned,

coll ective eoonomy had 1ro be

a

and he crlti.oiaed the Military

GoYel'llD ent fol" not eliminatS.ng all tons of colleetivism.l.91
Both Bobet Moses •n<l J. P . Warbfuos
measures

in the .ltuhr.

Clay, opposed

>b us. who had don-e

wn
a

study in the

1nteresta.1'2

Gerll arll" to proD101le its

believe either so ciall•
the Ruhr.

in the United

area

socialilatton
tor

Gmeral

British attempts to promo te social1aat1on in the Ruhr ed.

declared that the United States should. maintain

tor

conoemEKI witb

Be

or

free

call td fo:r

a

Warbu1ir. an economist,

en:terprl.. • tft)llld

"Ru.hr

strong preHnce in

a

pro'ride

did

not

th• solution

Coal Autborit;r, st similar to the !VA

Statee, to be Gre•ted t.o allo c ate ooal to lurope, and tbaa

end the q,oesti.on of $0cialisation fo:r the Ruhr. l9)
Hiatol'ian re1u · Hirsch criticiaed both th• SPD and the coo tor
ttpract.tcinc polities

aa

usual, • which he

claime<l had helped wreck Wad.mar.

The epeeifie instance to 'llhi oh Hinch re.tarred

waa

the SPD• s vi thdrwtl

into opp oaition .rter tbe COO had prevented it .t'rom attaining the
DiNOtcrate of

lcenomica in the BS.son.al �Jltio Council.

'belieTed p&rt;r cooperation

was

political behavior

an

wae

not

to Hirsch, who

e1Mnt1 a1 tor the At� ot Qemen;y, auch
enaouraging aipi.,Uk

Brandt, "la there Still a Chance tor GentlnTf-.America• •
P!EW:t!'tl (H•1'f Regn_,. �1111Yt *1't
Raaponsiblli \V 1 " Tbe 5-19 Attai:-e
.
19u8) , P• 23.
·

191.tari

l�.J,', Tu

Sep� 11, 1947.t P • 14.

l93d. P. Warburg, •Deadlock ovei- o.....,, , • :a.hind. the
VIII ( AprU 1$, 191& 7) , P • 26.

l9l&r.iu

Hirsch, "What Future for Germany, n XIII

�·

(October, 1947),

7k
Julian Bach,
in Germ.tn1'1 did not

an

Amer.I.can

t1nd the SPD• s desire to itlt>lement aocialiaation

partioularlt diaturb1ng.
pl'OpOaal.a of the

joumalist who bed vneled extenaivel.1

SPD.

Be

was more

oonoerned with the foreign polto.r

heh believed that the SPJ> • a remmc iation of

war

guilt and the need tor reparat.iena spoke ill tor the future, 11nce the

oppoaed

conaervat1ve1 would likelf be eTen more
teared that th• SPD

PO£MM,

was

•t.Jienc enough to ptlt it• Prtlll"lll into

the AMl'loan bueineas ugu1ne, •••

September of 1948 tha\ tbe United St."8
in

Ge:ma\1, ed.,

holte, 1\ ••• no

to then conoepW.

tbo'2P Bntain

vaa

Bach

praetice.19S

pleaeed to repon in

auppo� tr• enterprtse

waa

ttceeed" with sooialism a\

lonser pu*1ng tor it in

o.m-r. lst.£.1!!! believed

even

b.-ae aaterpri.ae now bad at 1.ean

•

•SO-SO•

the\

cha\M to be dold.nant in

Qel"U07.1"
lfa'°ld 8tae"'1, \Ile Qovemor of Mirmeaiie who
figure

on

eondition that the

a

promineftt

01l8D toag,

l\aop•

should be granted

wbe ia know. prilsu'il.7 for 'the pl• dealing w.l th
nlDMI , was

atrona opponent ot allowing sooialisa to gnv 1n Geau•DJ'•

US.rultan

Aaetftg•'I
91p•
)

heh,
RCldom Houee,

19'rad!!e

the

t>Uio indu•tn.. a. 1'7

nparatione bom Wbrld War I whioh beu• hia

torka

on

Brit.tab Oovttft'Dlell t lboal4 re.train boa auppo nmg

.turthv national1sat.1on ot

(New

thm

tbe national ln-11 oppo sed tme aooial.1aa"1cm ot indu stry and

beli8'f'ed U.. t Amer.lean i
a d to Weetem

German

was

!!IEll·

, P•

•

another

l'otlng f'Ml'ed

a as.a• !! !!t 9E!Ra,i&.,_

SeJ>tcber, 1948, P• 16.
1

1'1x..nndoa to Cl.ark M. Clittord, October 16, 947 , 1'be Pap er•
Clifford_. 1'be H81'l7 s . truman Library.

ot Clark M.

1

naUonalization of majoio indlaatrias which '111.')Uld be • reault

that t.be

� the prognm

hands ot

a

raponaored bf the SPD ._'1d
1. place too auch power in the

Young, ul tilut.1¥ be

that

a

people

soc1.Uet4.e
nd 110 uld

a

A.a
the

govel'!BMAt.

oentnd Germ•

one

!hie power could, according to

tu.mtMl qalnat tU Wutem Alllaa.

Be maintatne4

go� n a.a_, 11.n1ld. be a ._ater• ot V.
i

be

Ut\1.e different. f:r.'Qm

Gisfitng

�st govermqnts.1'8

mi ght. apect.. the National Auooia\ion of Collll$1"0 e oppo aed

obj ec\ivea of t.be SPD.

'fbie organiaation did not believe that tbe

United Stawa aboul.4 MD4 loea to European ooun.vtea who proposed
nationll1Bin1 their indll nrt•.

J. S. FUh•, the �hairaan of ttt.

Association' • Rnional Attain eo.it'- deol.aNd til•t. the Allerioan
go�t

dollars _.. mot aaain being uud. to advlDoe ao ci alistio

•Aaer.toan
prograa

ebould inaia\ tu t an aooo an'Uq be ....e.,d to ebow that

•

•

•

• in oount.rie1

aeh

u

GerraaDJ' . UP

'lboae indi'fidaal.1 n the Uni.S stt�s 1tbo npporte<l the
i

obj ectiff8 or the SPD toned

!!!
SPD.

York
He

!1!!!

va•

a

Drew x:t.ddletori of tM

bighl.J vocal criU.O of Aller.lea pollq toward ibe

ad'WOcatecl .faueri.oan 9Dpp0r\ for llf1' Oeman IO"'e1"Dlllft t Whioh

upheld ind1Y.ldual fr..._.
acoept

•ell JDinoriv.

•

the fact tbat

a

Middleton bell ev9'i iihe United S'8tea shoul.4

•dinaateful• aooi.Ust..tc p�t eoul.4 be

trom ORD D. Young to A\V.U Her1Jlan1 Sep tember 2 ,
1947, Record# of the Pretd.dent1 a Comlt'8e on Pohlp. Aid, h
! a
Ha1T7 s. Truman Libl'G7•

198i..tter

1"tetter bt>m J. a .
October ll1 l91'7i .leoerds ot
'1'he Harry s. frwlan Libr.,-.

1

' her to Senator Jo..,ta R. McCarthy,
the Pru:ld.ent• a coalttee on Fereign Aid,
1

a
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ruling Germany

BOon. 200

In his opinion, General

Glay had

a

"blind

e1pOt"

when it came to understanding the appeal of the policies of the SPD for
people. 201

the German

to Middleton, tbe laisaez... fa1re eocnomic policiea

of the CDU ·141::n1l d " shock Republ icans 1I1 the United States. u202
Journalist

Dorothy 'l'hompson

saw

being succesafull,y integrated

into the

that the Germane

1

were

used to

little

hope

ot the German

capitalist. world.

She claimed

ithighly integrated, state ccntrolled,

planned economy, which Wtf1'kfd• " and. provided. German wo:rk:ers
standard ot

living.

on

high

if it attempted to force free

Ger.many. 20J

Both �! Na»gF,t
supporters of the SPD.
most necessary

step

for

and

.The !!!

l!ePu\>lie witre s�ng joumalistio

In February of 191+7 The Nati.cm deolared that the
a

peaeatul and �cratio Germ1n1

socialimation ot major indus'llriee.
magazine ori ticised the

wee

the

It con<lerr.tned. the American "neutral n

policy which in realit7 di aooaraged moves 'bovard

United

a

She believed the United States would eventuallJr pay

a la.rge price in. American unemplo11tent
enterprise

ecoD0111

J2!£!!!); !! 99!eeirc••

public ownership .

The

which had declared tha.t t.he

States should prevent nationa11aation.

•

inc.e 0ermC'l1' could not

afford to provide sufficient compensation, and voiced the opinion that
the United States bad not
bad.

investment.a. 20li

fought

200nrew M1d.dl eton., 1'b,e
Wingate. 1949), P • 282.
201Ib;id. ' P•

a war

to reao� Amttrican bu siness trout

�trugte foz:
..

Germs

York :

All an

1)6.

202rud. , P• a.

203.tetter

(New

Dorothy Thompson to James F. Byrnes, July 16., 1946.,
The J eme s F. B;mes :Pepe.rs, The James F. Bymes ColloctJ.on of the Reibert
Muldrow Coope� Libt-81'1, Clem$on University, Clemson, South CsroliJ:u! �
from

204In! N&iio;,

Febru ary 8, 194'! 1 P • 26.

Kurt Schumacher and the SPD

in !l! !!! Re,.e11blio

in March of

received highly favorable treatment

1947 •

The SPD

an unstable s1 tWltion in GeniaDT.

entity in

soci al demoerac1 vould. provide the way to

waa

called.

democratic Germany.

clabJed that the Western world needed "good Germana vhci
time good in:terna tional

socialists. ti

Schaecher

was

" authentic harbinger ot convalesceneett in po st-war
In Mrs.
The fomer

Frank:µn :O. Roo seveltt the SPD had

First La41 viewed the SPD

democracy 1n Germany.
movement in
partner in

Truman,

believed that

a.rs

sme

called the most

Gem�.20S
an

friend.

infiuential

vital ingredient tor establishing
a

strong democratic labor

a.rm_, could lead the way to br:inging Gemmy 1n as

a

full

Executive CouncU of the American Federation o! Labor

the Gennan work.ere in the 5PD.

In

a

memorandum to President

the Council proposed that the United States adhere to the policy

that " all

nations whom

we

aid. have the

in'Violable right to decide

democr'41tieally their own. political and. economic rel ations. "
A. F. o:f

The

L. declared this policy should. not applJ' to "totalitarian"

governments, but aey democratic politic.l end economic
as

at th&

It

the communi ty of free nationa. 206

The
supported

Sh•

as a

.f'airJ.1 stable

to 1!!! !!! Rsaubl1o,

Aeoording

a new

a

that espoused by

philosophy,

such

the SPD, should be acceptable to the United States. 201

2°''l'h• l]!w

Republic, March lO, l.947 1 P• 26.

�.I.Te,

June

3, 19461 P• 8.

201Memorandum trom the Executive Council of the .Ameri can ?ede:ration
of Labor to President Truman• December 19, l9h7, The P ap ers of Harr ;r s.
( These paper s, a s w�,.u a s tho se
Truman, The Harry s. Truman Library.
previously cited t.rom unpublished collections, were gemiro u sly loaned to
me by my advisor_. Dr. Wolfgang Schlauch. )
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Carl Land•••

!?! J:\!Um ti.f!9.!2'a
the strongest
a

a

tor.mer German

Jp9rp4

�1-4 the opinioa that d.ee cratie social.1• would be

.force tor

torce that h.C stood

an

reconatrtaetdon ot Oermaror.

ethical

•re

Thie vaa

•tnmal.Y than -.:y other in the recmt pa st

tor the •J>rotb.el'bood ot num. •
d.ellerita,

"leftist• wriUng in the

hgardlea• ot it.e eoonend.c Jllledte or

�er 'believecl that aocJ.al daocn07 wo ald have to plaJ' •

v.t.tai m• tn

GertlanJ• •

tu"1N. aoe

Fred.I Utl.q, following

atudt .the had llade ot th• German

a

ai�ation, acwsed the United States of t.17ing to f'OJ"Oe Genm;r,
w1 th stl'Ong

nation

tt'Hitiona and • high level. of oul �, to •coap t Allerlcan

inetitu.tiona,

She believed thie

like the tree ente:rpriM •Y•tem.

impo s sible tuk, eapeciall.Y
a

a

linoe

the Uld.W States

belligerent, i&noren\1 manner. 209

CKWS •

VIS

waa an

IOina a\toat. it in

w.a-.t ot the SPD 1• •

prime exmaple of Miu Utl.91' e t.heaia.
Ca1'l. E. SOhorske wrote Ql'llP &thetically that the SPD had. becm
.taoed With "al.most

inauperablett pro'bl•• un4u tile occupation.

profound hatred of Coamd.a

on

the

part. of the SPD lead.6ra

according to Schoran, .toroe th• to maintain
choosing capit.alist-democray

over

a

The

voul4,

pro-Weetem orientation,

t.otal1tarien-1C>cial1•• 2l.O

Schorake

c riticised the United. Stat.a tar blocld.ng attempts to aocialiu the
208aar1 wauw, •Tne m1ea and 0el'Mft7' •
Modem �·tou. XVIII (September, 1946) , 26o.
209Freda. Utley, J!!! �
Itegnery Company, 1949 ) , P• �

Future, • J2w;n& st,
'

£1!! 2£ Y19UE!! ( Cld.cagot

2lOcari E. Schorllke 1 "Th• DUemrua in Gem11m71 •
Q!al'terl.z ��ew, mv (Winter, 1948) , J2.

H81U7

VirmJ;!

19
Ruhr industrie,s and tor promo ting the restoration of the
initiative. ..

It vu evident to

area

to

ttpriwie

Schorske that t.he United State&, while

proclaiming that the qu •stion of aociall.zatic:m would be left up to the
German

P110P1••

was

restored and the
Al though
"le.ft•

trying to delay the decision until prosper1"1 had bee

"entrepeneu.l"Ml cl ass"
there

was SOlll e

v:a a

aglin doMinant in Geman,y. 211

support for the go al s of the SPD lllOl'll

leaning indiVidu•l• in the United States, the ntejorU;y ot

llinfomed•

.Auaerioana

wen

oppo se4 to the SPD and 1te

Unf'ortunatel.y tar a.man $ocial Demoorac,-. it
majority who

were

the m•bers of this

moat able to ...t their 1ntlueno•

policy towal'd Gensan.y.

�!i!&�•t

was

P•

41.

objectives.

over

.Aaerican

!he question of whether or not the tlni:ted 8t1k8 intentrionally
tried to prevsi\ the SPll t.rom aetWn1ng its pal of
in

a

a

aoeiali•t eGOftOJV'

st.rong centralised nattonel state hae 'been debatecl sinee the

daJ"•

of tbe oooup ation.
M8ft1 or the opiniona ?Oiced 1n the l9SO ' a at the height of the
Cold

War claiud theft ••• lit.iile ev.t.dfmoe to ind1oate \hat the United

Statea oppo sed

th• SPD or aided ita ri'111 , Um CW •

Hanld Zink, the

otticial hiatiori.an tor t.he American OCC12pation, wrote that. clfd.me of
b1aa

wre

ua&l••ted., and

were

probabl.7

hter, prior to t.he l9S3 eleottona.
Zink bell.,.. 1t •••

the l'fuNlt of atateents made

It there were Cl1' faw.tritiam shovn,

bec•UM the coo t� Ammom. plans tor

ltlRi , whtoh the SP»
1ntearatma GenllDT into � W.stein �--- eOlllv
opposed.. 211

Poli\ioal Mienti•t RS.chuel Sc._. baa reached
oonclueion.
on

the

He

a

similar

u1nUiQ \bat All erioc occupation authorit:lea

were,

whole, 6un1nter•eW• 1n poUtiea, ad the MaC\ion they had

toward Gema

political acti..t.tiea vu l•rcelr one of •ap•thT• •

Scamaon

beliftvu that Altericau 1lho � pol114cs at all would have
tnored tJle

cm, wb.ieh,

2UaaoU

Zizdc,

1n cw.mtran to the SPD, adwo.W tree enterprise ,
Thp

!J&, Ja G.!l'MV•
60

P•

3)7 •

bot he doe• not � tlleN

waa

aotive

Aller.l ean apport tor the coo.

lowve.r, Soanaon prUfllte no d1.-mable � to• b1 a oOJlOluaion.1
which ia that \he Uni'Md States
J. s.

us

neu'1'al. 21)

Manin, • .Aaertoa attom.tq who hat! IC"V'ed 'IdVt OJGUS

Oerunr, has taken

He

1a ot the apint.on thet tile pre1«1ce in 1ibe lfili\817 Govurmterl\ ot

Aaericlfl firllts , Jt.lOh

1

as

dltterent Viev

regardiq

in

Oenenl Motors and

Atnencari 1nvo1Tement.

Republic Steel ,

whiob had

adntaine<l p,._,,.r arrangeaunts with such au.a induatrie1 as I .a. Farben ,
bed an

etteot upon O!GUS policies. 21h

tovmi tba CW

Such un

W'Ottl d natuNlly be dJt-..

-1 would have opposed BPD � ob3eot1YU.

lleMn\ biator:t.an• brft oontdlwec:I tne debate over A111er.l. can
att.ttuclea tow.rd tba SPD.
the SP»

John Hairell 'bel.1"'" 01q 1'11 srlapioioua ot

&4 the •tlvu of �.

f'ederal.1• and f:Ne •1Htrpri•• made tt
o'theni•• 23$

CQ.q • 1 con'd.oUou in f'8'VOr ot

nead.T illpo•lible

Llo.14 Gal'dner Min\ain• that

aa

tor hbJ tio be

n.1.ation s with the Sorta\

Union ware -� IM O'J..,-• 1 .tear• ot So'fiet inlp1red -�-

1.ncreasect, Clay

abut ott ...,. lldld. tome ot eoei.U.718'ion in the

wutem

1'M 110n the SPD attacked theae policiu, the aore ettorte

scmae.

OHH1I dda

on

�t ol the CW. 21' OU'drter Mlle Uxd.ted Statee polJ.07

82
in 0erntln1'

one

".Meri.can counter-?<ew>l.tttion• against., &llOng other

of

ll7
things, the SPD.

John Gimbel oppoaea the tbeo17 that the Amertcan deain to pNmOte
ente:rpriae plf11'14

tree

poliq in
on

a

p1'01lliner1t role in United States occupation

While he admits that there

Gtmn anJ'•

ws

anti•a:)(lialist bias

the part ot officials Uk• a.tar, he maintain& that aome historians•

su oh

oveN11phaeiled the etfect ot thia pnjud.iae in

G�r, have

as

areas vhe?'e it bad

bealtlng.

no

BJm••� Stattgart .,..m.

a on of
Gimbel cd.tes the interpfftt!

aa a � emaple of tbia. a.8

On the baaia of Vda m. tar• a re8Ql'Ch• tAte evidence lean•
11 ttle doubt •• to the nature ot .AJll erican a\t.1tudee toward the SPD.
niere

Only
the

was
a

tn 1nd1T.l4ul.e, HIV of

SPD.

ettaet

relatiftl.r litG.• apport. tor t.be SPD in. ta. United States.
th8'I "ht\ v:Ulg• :lnt.el.lectuJ.a, fa'fOred

Howeft\?'1 1b.eH WN not 1n

on

.Aaen.oan

Gerlt-.V
ocoupation.
occupation,

policT

fftla

Ult$

Luc:lue D.

�il

C1Q'

191'9

was the

was a

to h..,..

a

trerf llleable

det'eatacl en.,- \1Dder ndli t_,.

llfteri can in comtnd of that

8DC\ be was t1.ml.7 oomitted to

point out tu

one oen

po.S.tion

•

tha\• althoqh his otf'ieial polic1

It

a

•••

l.ul B\lmB!!•

n•wal• •it

vae our

Ba

a6li te

._

•

•

•

ae.dt.• of t.Ne entus>riae • .211

one

rev.I._.. Atler.1.o. actions in the 0-.tn. politioal area,

easU1 detect tbe AIMri.OM e.imdtm.t to tne enterprise.

21.?!We ,

P•

21'1.Hlaa

Chf1

lh6.

218Jobn �. 0Cold Wal't
••tens. II (Spring, 1971). Sl.

Gena• :r.ont, "

hJd:l!!n J:! �

P•

Tb# �

2'l•

TM

to

period

fro• HQ' of

194$

antil.

Septeltber

8l
ot

Ub,6 NW American policy

shitt tl'01n one ot punittv• rennet.tons to one of
__,,. , .

economy

on

a

philo eopht.

'l'h• SPD• a

d9aads tor soe141aation

centraliud � did not meet the objecttvea ot Ammean

post-var .tomcn polley in
The Clriais
interest in

over

l

danger

a

rapidly polarising world.

the SID is

an

example of t.be Uatted States •

prevenUng the So'1'1et Union t:rom con'brolling

o cia la t-oonauni st

S

th• .tonaw

the 1>4tsia or free enterprtee, in line Vith American

political and eoonomic
and

rebu1lding

party in V•tem Germanf•

a

fused

In this inateoe, tb•

to .&Hric• objeotivea in Ge� app&eecl to be sre•• if tbe

Sov.l.et 'backe4 SID ,..... aUe1*1 to dominate the 1-aclereb1p ot the
cl.au 1n the wutarn 110nu than it
aociali.111 maintained.
Stai.a oppo aed the
tbe

•ridnc

the SPD and. its milder tons ot

wol'ktnc claaa lo,yal.t.y.

As a

result, tbe United

merger ot the SPD and tb4I XPD, and the PD Nll&l.Md
S

pritur,y working ol.••• pan,, in the ,,..t;eni anea.
During the period after D.Jma•' speech It Stuttgart, the SPD

began 1lo

pueh at.ronaJ.7 eocial.1.s•\ton ot indu..., .

Schumacher,

was a

oonatant

Ita

leader, l urt

tho:m in the side of the W.etern Allies,

�I their o oeupat.tn
polici.ea and point:lna out the neaeui\f tor
o
soei.U. to be
met. with

impl ..tec.t

in �-·

equal coun �H\11"9

th• powra proVided. to it

as an

ab1e to aaooeeafuU, block SPll
Thi a

can

on

This p:reaaure by the SPI> vas

the pan ot

a, u!Qg

th• Ameri�-..

oocupa\ton toi-ce, the Uni te4 states ..,..

movu

toward aoei.iia aU.on ot indu•trT •

be ,... 1n the ._.ican po�" er aoc1al.iaation

meaaure•

appnved by the Gfmla8 and in th• American Ol'gani.Zation of bimonal
ageoies ad oouncU s to recmce SPD in.f'luenoe, to cite only tw

�···

•
The debates during the

drafted

an

ful'ther

s

ver us

centralisation.

•

approval.
re'\um

Th• Allia:r.:t oans

feder.U, at.ructured Germe ft.Public.

atrengtJi in the Parliuan\art Counoil
able to produee

was

eqael. to ibat ot the coo . na

However, the United

States ncoeedM.. by tb:tea�r

a

laaitJ ta which eontain«l

American

reaction to the time ot the SPJ>.

ocoupatd.on period, fro• bis nfU Nl to
ociali aa tion measun1

s

of 1 ts

alloW the

Le

ind.ieatd.ve

ot

throughout the

Be1ee to impleMl'l\

con.at1 tutd.on to his deltt.Y in tran811ti tt.!ng

co:ncU:tatory let.tel' from the Allied Foftd.gn Minlstere to the
no

SPD, reveal. bow �t.Nl· .Merica poliq

Cold War piog:re&ud1 and eoci&l iam
the minda of

ao

manr

was

p0ai'tion to

West

poli tit.cal

waa

benefit tor

1n rulity.

As the

being flqtlated with commu.ni• in

paopl•, the IPD must ha,,. appeared even more dubiou

with re.spec\ to American economic and

on

are

Hie actions

Perliamentey Council \lft"U after it could have

the

1a0re

features than the SPD deeind.
Th• at\ittldea and decisions of General Clq

the

'°

the whol.e queaUon of • ncnt Oenl• .Wte back 1lo the l'weip

fedel'al

the

The SPD, whose

dratts of the Baio Law whioh were not met with Anteri..e an

Mim.stezra• Confer-..., 1n. getUng

th•

being

tbroughoat the diaeueaions to COD'lince the Germana

appli.C pressure
ot the need tor

vae

•tconi• between the United ltltff ad the SPD

the iaaue of tederaliam

over

period. 1n which the Buie Law

effectivel.T illpo ae

political interests.

Olay vu 1n

his economic and pclitic4 oonoeptiona

Gelmtm.11 and thi s he finll1 attempted

to

do.

Perhaps

it ia

unrealistic to expect him to have acted othend.ee.
!broughout the pel'iod of \he occupation, the United Statee
proclaimed

a

pollor ot neuV.U '1 towud Genta pollt.:l.cal parties, and.

it muat

be admitted that this writer baa found

that OMJUS interfered in

no

evidance to indicate

the electoral. process to prevent the German

people from

Hl.ect1ng 1rh• par\;1 ot t;heir choice, be it the SPD

otlMnd.se .

Honv.r, the United States did do what conquering nations

have

o:r

dona since the t.im• ot Caesar, and that is to attempt to impose ita

own systems upon the

nation it has conquered, and to

use

that nat.ton as

a component in the foreign policy o:t the v:lctorioua power.

ofticial.e believed that .federalism
qetem o.'f'.t'ered the best
&.U'op• ' ••

and

spee1fieally the tree enterprise

hop• tor 0.rmarJT ' s future,

large part to Aaerican etfo:rts,

a

political.l.71

provide

a

strong

which

u

wll a s W.atem.

and above all , the containing of Scrvi.t Comtmmi am.

stable West Gernu1r17 did

Amerl.can.

eoonomically',

Du• in
aid

aocial.1.7

bulwadc against Ru ssian presau"

stood tor l!IOOialisa n
a d eentnUAt4.on1.

coUl.d be apected to be

oppo aed b:f Amerl.can occupti:ii.on authori\1.... who believed in distinctJ.t
ditterent
from

•o

c.i,aI. and

194$ until 191&9.

economic valuaa.

1bis was the

can
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authorise the Mtniartea-Preaidm\ ot the states of their

apective aonee to convene •

l , Sept.her 19b8.
�

oonatltue\ � to 'be held not latv than

Th• del4tgates to this ••--11 ldll be chosen in ooh

ot the exintng state. un4-' such pl'OCedu:re and. repl.ationa

4Kloptecl by
ot

as

the 1egiala1d.ve 'bodl' ot each of t.heN atatee.

delegates to the conatituct.

the to tll.
uy

a�

pop\lla \iona at the la••

oenaue

as

&ball be

The total number

w1ll be -� bJ di'V'iding

by vso.oo

or acme simile figure

be reoo•en4ed b)' tJie Hirdaten-Pruidet n.4 approYed by the

M1l1 t07 Oovarnor•.
the

r..

...

that 1ta

!be

ntaber ot delegates fl'o11 each stat.I will be in

proportion to the total.

�P of tbe conatttu.ent uaemblJ'

population is to the toUl populatton 0£ 1ibe participating stat.a.
•••enabl.7 will draft

a

delloontic constitution whioh

partioipati.ng states

a

�tal structure 0£

The conat.ituent
w111 establi ah tor the
federal type

vhich 1• best adapted to the ewritual re-establishment of

German uni '7

at present di srupted, and which protect the rights of the
91

92
prov.ide ad.equate authority1 and contain guararrteea

participating statea#
of indiVidual
It
not

rights and freedoms.

the conaUtut.ion

as

p repared by the consti tu ant assembly does

cont'lict With th••• general principle,, the Military Governors will

'thoriae

the

aubmistld.on for ratifi.cati.on.

wil.l thereupon be dissolved.

adopt.

a

referendum requirina

a

simple majoritf'

state under l\leh rulu and procedure

it mq

as

When the constitution has been ratitied by two-thirds ot the

etatea, it

lfill CCJll8 into force and be binding upon all atatea.

atter, any amendment

to the constitut:lon must be ratified by

majority of t.be stat.a.
.toroe

usemb)¥

The rat.i.f'icat.i.on Will take place by each

participating state by meas of
0£ the voters in uch

The const.ituent

a

There
like

W1 thin thirty days follow.f.,ng tho coming into

of the oonstituti.on, the institutiona for whieh it provides shall

be eetablisbe4.

APPENDIX B

BASIC

�R

REPUBLIC OF GiRMANY

THE FEDIRAL
PRE.AMIIJjj

Conacioue of it.a

HepOnaibility before God am before man, inspired.

b7 the reeolw t.> preaet'ft ita national earl poli:M.Nl md. \y and ti.> serve
world peace

as an

equal partner in

in the l.aend.er

a

united Bvope, the German people

ladm, Bavaria, Bnnan, � a.....

Lover

S8XOft7, Nort.h-llb.ine-We•tpbalia, Bbinal.Cld.-Pal.atinate, SChl.eswig.
Hol stein, Waerttembera•lad.ttn and

baa, by

virtue of it• oonetituen\

Federal Republic

W\tert�msollem

povel:', enaow this Basie Law ot the

of Oentan1 to i
g ve a new order to political lite tor

a

trmai tional period.
It
was

baa 81• acted on behalf of thou Gemma to who• participation

denied.
'l'be

entire GeNan people 1• ull ed 'IPQB to achieve, by free sel.f

determination, tb.e

�tr and freedom ot GttNany.

